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Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation,
the Policies of Clear Statement,
and Federal Jurisdiction
WILLIAM V. LUNEBURG*

I.
My experience as a State court judge and as a State legislator has
given me a greater appreciation of the important role the States play
in our federal system, and also a greater appreciation of the separate

and distinct roles of the three branches of government at both the
State and the Federal levels. Those experiences have strengthened
my view that the proper role of the judiciary is one of interpreting
and applying the law, not making it.
Justice-designate Sandra Day O'Connor
before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
September 9, 1981.'

When a nominee to the United States Supreme Court asserts her belief
that the appropriate role for the courts is to "interpret and apply" and
not "make" the law, certainly those with more than a passing knowledge
of the law's processes can be excused if they express considerable puzzlement. What must she mean? Even putting to one side the problems of
"discovering" meaning in the general, often vague, language of the Constitution, the pronouncements of legislatures in the form of statutes hardly
present the judiciary with self-applying maxims leaving little or no room
* B.A., Carleton College; J.D., Harvard University. Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh. Professors Arthur Helman, Mark Nordenberg and Gerald Torres offered
valuable suggestions on preliminary drafts of this article, which assistance was much appreciated. However, the final version purports to represent my own views. A research
stipend from the School of Law assisted in its completion. Finally, I want to acknowledge
the unflagging research and editorial assistance provided by Ms. Rona Pietrzak, a thirdyear student at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
' Hearingson the Nomination of Sandra Day O'ConnorBefore the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary,97th Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. J-97-51, at 57 (1981).
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for judicial creativity. 2 Given her professional experience we must assume
that Justice O'Connor would acknowledge at least that much.
The folklore that judges do not (or should not) "make law" is by no
means restricted to the United States.' Public promotion of that folklore,
however, is of questionable value as a public service and seems inconsistent with the stress currently being placed on "open government" and
citizen awareness of the actual processes of government.4 At the same
time it must be admitted that there are instances where a court dealing
with statutory materials may abjure a law-making function without
imparting an entirely misleading impression regarding what is in fact
occurring.
This is the case where a court refuses to supplement a statutory scheme
with common law rules allegedly necessary to the successful implementation of the goals of the legislature or at least consistent with their
realization.' Perhaps it was law-making of this nature that Justice
O'Connor was promising she would avoid. Given both constitutional and
statutory restrictions on the federal courts, there is only a limited sphere
in which judicial creativity of this nature can operate.' Thus, her
reassurance was unnecessary, unless it was intended to express her belief
that the appropriate scope of federal common law should be particularly
narrow.
On the one hand, an aversion to avoidable judicial law-making may be
rooted in perceptions regarding the "appropriate" allocation of power,
whether or not demanded by the Constitution, between the legislature
and the courts and between the national and state governments. Judicial
creativity is seen not only as a usurpation of the power of the electorally
responsible co-equal branch and an impermissible intrusion on the reserved
powers of the states but also in some cases as an unjustifiable technique
which enables legislators to escape from making politically difficult decisions. The preeminent position of the legislature as policy-maker and Congress as guardian of the interests of the states is allegedly maintained
by eschewing judicial creativity. On the other hand, criticism of judicial
law-making may constitute an elliptical way of expressing disagreement
with the substantive policies sought to be advanced by the courts,7 even
where those policies are consistent with the ascertainable legislative will.
In some of its manifestations, this critical approach may undermine, rather
than advance, ultimate legislative supremacy.

I

See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 13-33
(1975) [hereinafter cited as DICKERSON].
See 0. HETZEL, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 367-78 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HETZEL].
See, e.g., The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. S 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980);
The Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. S 552(b) (1976).
See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 250-51.
See infra text accompanying notes 432-54.
See HETZEL, supra note 3, at 373.
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Justice O'Connor's opening remarks in her testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee suggest a particular concern for maintenance of the
"appropriate" balances between state and federal governments and among
the three branches of the national government. She joins a tribunal
recently characterized as "The Rehnquist Court."8 This label reflects a
perceived predominance of his vision in the Supreme Court's current work
product. Moreover, the newest Justice is expected to closely align herself
with the views of her former Stanford classmate.' In fact, the positions
which she took during the 1981-82 Term provide some confirmation for
early predictions," though there are exceptions to this."1
Justice Rehnquist's opinions display a punctilious concern for issues
of federalism and separation of powers. Not surprisingly, his perceptions
regarding the appropriate allocation of governmental authority, along with
his apparent substantive policy predilections, infuse his approach to
statutory materials. Given his present and probable future prominence
in the work of the Court, the time seems ripe to examine in detail some
aspects of his approach. 2
The opinions of Justice Rehnquist in the area of federal court jurisdiction are particularly revealing sources of insight into his underlying views;
therefore, they serve as the focus of this article. Specifically, this article
will highlight his treatment of the problems of pendent jurisdiction, implied
rights of action under federal statutes, and the displacement of federal
common law by congressional action. 3 An examination of his opinions
'Fiss & Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 10, 1982, at 14
[hereinafter cited as Fissl.
9 Id. at 17. Cf. Schenker, "Reading" Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 31 CATH. U.L. REV.
487 (1982) (which, however, suggests she may be a "swing" vote).
"IFor example, in Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982) (holding
that the collision of two pleasure boats in navigable waters was within the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts). Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger, joined
a dissent by Justice Powell bemoaning the fact that "[n]o trend of decisions by this Court
has been stronger-for two decades or more-than that toward expanding federal jurisdiction at the expense of state interests and state court jurisdiction." Id. at 2260. The dissenters
objected to, inter alia, the fact that expansion of federal admiralty jurisdiction was accompanied by application of substantive, pre-empting federal law. Id. at 2660-61.
" See, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assoc., Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981)
(Justice Rehnquist for the majority found that the "principle of comity" barred federal
court adjudication of a suit for damages under 28 U.S.C. S 1983 against county officials
for allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax system. Id. at 107. Justice O'Connor concurred in an opinion by Justice Brennan arguing that federal jurisdiction should
be merely conditioned on the exhaustion of state administrative remedies. Id. at 133-37.
See also Schenker, supra note 9, at 490.
" For other examinations of Justice Rehnquist's work product which do not deal directly
with the specific topics under discussion here, see, e.g., Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A
Preliminary View, 90 HARv. L. REV. 293 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Shapiro]; Rydell, Mr.
Justice Rehnquist and Judicial Self-Restraint, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 875 (1975).
"I Immunity of states from suit in federal court is an area not touched upon, but is one
where Justice Rehnquist has also expressed his adherence to a clear statement approach.
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). See also M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 165 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REDISH].
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shows, among other things, an apparent willingness to accept broad delegations of law-making power to the courts in the procedural area but a
vigorous assertion of limitations on congressional power to transfer
substantive law-making to the other branches. His treatment of statutory
materials also displays particular interest in both safe-guarding the States'
law-making competence and protecting, and even enhancing, their ability
to provide alternative tribunals to the federal courts for dispute resolution.
While some of these general conclusions are unlikely to provoke much
surprise, what is particularly significant and not so well understood is
Rehnquist's method of handling statutory sources which is employed to
advance both these general concerns and other more specific (and perhaps
less defensible) goals. Among other things, that approach reveals a particularly strong penchant for policies of clear statement14 which in some
of their manifestations may not be entirely consistent with legislative
supremacy.15 In fact, according to one commentator, the clear-statement
model of statutory interpretation is becoming a prominent characteristic
of the Court's technique. 6 The following analysis confirms that conclusion and suggests factors motivating Justice Rehnquist which are likely
shared by some of his fellow Justices.
To facilitate evaluation of the Rehnquist opinions, the first section of
this article analyzes what is involved in statutory interpretation in general
and the bases for judicial imposition of clear-statement requirements. It
also gives an overview of the statutory subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal district courts, which is relevant in various respects to each of
the specific areas under examination. Following this, the focus shifts to
pendent jurisdiction, and in particular the case of Aldinger v. Howard.7
There, in the context of emphasizing the statutory limitations on the
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court refused to permit the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction based on such an unconvincing rationale that one must search beneath
the surface to discover the real reasons for the result. Next, the Court's
recent approach to implied rights of action is examined with emphasis
on the analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,8 another Rehnquist
opinion. A refusal to allow the judiciary to assume a role which he sees
as reserved to Congress underlies his position here, and is likewise mirrored in the Justice's recent attempted resurrection of the non-delegation
doctrine. 9 Finally, the issue of displacement of federal common law is
" See infra text accompanying notes 37-71 for a discussion of policies of clear statement
as a technique of statutory interpretation.

MsSee Fiss, supra note 8, at 16, 18.

" See Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretationin
the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 892, 902 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Intent].
"7Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
" Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
"9See Industrial Union Dep't. v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment).
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examined in the context of the Rehnquist majority opinion in City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois.20 The already circumscribed area for the operation
of federal common law is further narrowed as a consequence of that
decision, for reasons ultimately very similar to those operating in Aldinger
and Touche Ross.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
A.

Statutory Interpretation and Policies of Clear Statement

Judicial opinions on the interpretation of statutes are replete with
references to presumptions, or suggestions of the existence of presumptions, amounting to what are here called policies of clear statement.
In effect, these presumptions all say to the legislature, "If you mean
this, you must say so plainly."
21
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks.
It appears generally conceded that in dealing with the authoritative
pronouncements of legislatures in a governmental structure characterized
by a separation of powers, as found on the federal and state levels in
the United States, the initial task for a court is to do its best to ascertain
the "intent" of the popularly elected representatives regarding the problem to be decided.' Only when the language of the statutory vehicle, read
in its proper context, is unclear in its bearing on a case presented for
decision does it become the judge's task to fashion a meaning that appears to be the most "appropriate" one in the circumstances to assign
to the statute in the case at hand.' Thus, contrary to folklore, the interpretative task is twofold. It is cognitive in the sense of "discovering"
meaning and creative in the sense of assigning meaning to otherwise
unclear statutory directives.' However, to preserve legislative supremacy
in the creation of law, cognition must precede creativity.28 If cognition
alone allows the judiciary to ascertain an intent regarding the problem
at issue, the court is bound to effectuate that intent.
Conversely, the exclusive means by which a legislature may create new
law is by enacting a statute.' As the Supreme Court has acknowledged,
"legislative intention, without more, is not legislation."28 The courts are
22

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).

21 H.

HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND

APPLICATION OF LAW 1240 (10th ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as HART & SACKS].
2 DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 7-9, 13, 15, 20.

Id. at 18.
2

Id. at 13.

Id. at 13-33.
Id. at 20.
1 Id. at 9.
21 Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 45 (1975). See also
21, at 1412.

HART

& SACKS, supranote
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thus constitutionally bound to respect the legislative will only to the extent
that it is conveyed in the constitutionally permitted manner, that is, by
means of the language of the enactment read in the appropriate context.
The latter includes, for example, "the pervasive network or grid of concepts presupposed by the language" used in the jurisdiction.29 Context
may narrow or, more rarely, broaden the literal meaning of statutory
that Congress can convey its intent either
terms." It is frequently said
"expressly" or "impliedly."' However, both types of meaning depend on
context to a greater or lesser degree. 2
In attempting to quarry meaning, the courts rely heavily on certain
presumptions regarding how legislatures operate and use language. Such
presumptions include that the statutory vehicle employs established conventions of language common to the legislature and the intended
legislative audience and that the same words are used consistently
throughout a document prepared at the same time.3 In short, these
presumptions, reflect in large degree the courts' perceptions of matters
extraneous to the written vehicle relied upon and taken into account by
the legislature in conveying its message, in other words the presumed
context. 4 A court may of course be incorrect in making one or more of
these presumptions and, thus, miss the intended legislative message. Yet,
even if a court could ascertain that one or more of these presumptions
is incorrect as a matter of fact in a particular case, it may sometimes
justifiably rely on them because of constitutional constraints that limit
the legislature. For example, notions of fairness implicit in the due process clause of the fifth amendment35 arguably require Congress to speak
in terms readily understood by the intended audience so that the latter
can conform its behavior to the requirements of the law.3
The statutory vehicle read in proper context may disclose a meaning
with relative clarity or with varing degrees of obscurity. Inability to find
clear guidance in a statute respecting an issue to be resolved in a situation where the statute appears to be applicable may result from, for instance, either the legislature's failure to consider the problem facing the
court or the failure of the legislature, or its draftsman, to express
themselves in sufficiently precise terms. Alternatively, the lack of clar-

DICKERSON,

supra note 2, at 106.

Id. at 198-201.
, See, e.g., New York Dep't of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 417 (1973).
32 DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 40-42. More precisely "express meaning" is "[1literal (dictionary) meaning, so far as permitted by particular context" and "implied meaning" is "[t]he
meaning that particular context adds to express meaning." Id. at 284.
3

DICKERSON,

supra note 2, at 223-24.

Id. at 124.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 Cf. DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 209.
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ity may be traceable to the unwillingness of the legislature to confront
squarely the matter at issue.
So-called clear-statement techniques of statutory interpretation function in part to free a court from its duty to abide by the results of its
investigation into the meaning of the statute. That is, the court's demand
for clarity on the part of the legislature if a certain result is to obtain
may in fact result in disregard of the actual legislative intent which has
been expressed in the constitutionally mandated manner, though with less
precision than required by the court. 7 To that extent, the principle of
legislative supremacy is subordinated.38 The traditional disposition to
strictly construe criminal statutes is an example of the operation of a
policy of clear statement in the service of the constitutional value of fair
notice. 9
For present purposes a more relevant instance of the operation of clearstatement methodology is found in New York Departmentof Social Services
v. Dublino,4 an important preemption case" which, as we shall see, relates
directly to Justice Rehnquist's approach to the preservation of federal
common law in the face of congressional action.42 The controversy in
Dublino was whether the Federal Work Incentive Program (WIN) barred
a state from independently requiring individuals to accept employment
as a condition for receipt of federally funded aid to families with dependent children. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, stated as follows:
This Court has repeatedly refused to void state statutory programs,
absent congressional intent to pre-empt them.
"If Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest
its intention clearly. It will not be presumed that a federal statute
was intended to supersede the exercise of the power of the state
unless there is a clear manifestation of intention to do so. The
exercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed."
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202-203 (1952).
... Moreover, at the time of the passage of WIN in 1967, 21 States
already had initiated welfare work requirements as a condition of
AFDC eligibility. If Congress had intended to pre-empt state plans
and efforts in such an important dimension of the AFDC program as
employment referrals for those on assistance, such intentions would
in all likelihood hav been expressed in direct and unambigious language.
No such expression exists, however, either in the federal statute or
in the committee reports. 3
7

Cf. HART & SACKS, supra note 21, at 1412-13.
DICKERSON,

supranote

2, at 207.

Id. at 208-11.
'

413 U.S. 405 (1973).

"See Note, The PreemptionDoctrine:Shifting Perspectiveson Federalismand the Burger

Court, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 623, 643-49 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Preemption
Doctrine].
12
'1

See infra text accompanying notes 516-32.
413 U.S. at 413-14 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
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The Court failed to find the required clarity of expression, and thus
refused to void the state program."
Justice Marshall, in dissent, viewed the operation of the state program
differently. It was seen as operating to exclude persons eligible for
assistance under federal standards by imposing additional conditions of
eligibility. He countered with a different requirement of clear statement,
which he found was not satisfied in the case at bar:
As we said in Townsend v. Swank... "in the absence of congressional
authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from the Social
Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility standard that
excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal AFDC standards
violates the Social Security Act and is therefore invalid under the
Supremacy Clause." ... Thus, according to the rules of interpretation
we have heretofore followed, the proper inquiry is whether the Social
Security Act or its legislative history clearly shows congressional
authorization for state employment requirements other than those
involved in WIN.4"
In some instances the Court's refusal to accept on6 interpretation of
a statute over another on account of the lack of "direct and unambiguous
language" may reflect its perception of how a legislature in fact operates."
For example, reading between the lines, the concluding excerpt from
Justice Powell's opinion might be taken as saying that, given the
widespread nature of state work requirements when Congress acted in
1967, it could reasonably be assumed that Congress knew of those
measures and, given its traditional solicitude for protecting state
prerogatives,4" legislators taking these factors into account would use
"express" language of preemption if they really intended to displace state
law. The use of the phrase, "such intentions would in all likelihood," suggests that the Court was at least in part weighing probabilities in coming
to its conclusion. On this view the Court is attempting to divine and to
carry out actual legislative intent.
On the other hand, the first portion of the excerpt from the Powell
opinion uses the word, "should," implying that the Court may very well
be unconcerned with ascertaining the true intent of Congress, but rather,
has determined to set down a standard which the legislature is expected
to meet. In other words, as a matter of policy, the Court may be making

" Id. at 423. The Court refused to resolve, however, the question whether some particular sections of the New York Work Rules might contravene the specific provisions of
the Federal Social Security Act.
" Id. at 423-24 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
" Cf.P. MISHKIN & C. MORRIS, ON LAW IN CouRTs 510 (1965) ("Isn't it true in fact that Con'
gress does not generally try to infringe upon constitutionally protected values. ) [hereinafter

cited as MISHKIN & MORRIS].

See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Wechsler].
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demands on the Congress which that body must meet if it is to accomplish
its objectives, in an area where the aims of the state program seem
particularly important to the Justices, and perhaps even congenial to their
personal policy predilections. 8
Unlike Justice Powell in Dublino, Justice Marshall was more willing
to elaborate on the reasons for the clear-statement principles upon which
he relied. He noted:
The policy of clear statement in Townsend serves a useful purpose.
It informs legislators that, if they wish to alter the accommodations
previously arrived at in an Act of major importance, they must indicate clearly that wish, since what may appear to be minor changes
of narrow scope may in fact have ramifications throughout the administration of the Act. A policy of clear statement insures that Congress
will consider those ramifications, but only if it is regularly adhered to.
Finally, it is particularly appropriate to require clear statement of
authorization to impose additional conditions of eligibility for public
assistance. Myths abound in this area. It is widely yet erroneously
believed, for example, that recipients of public assistance have little
desire to become self-supporting ....Because the recipients of public

assistance generally lack substantial political influence, state legislators
may find it expedient to accede to pressures generated by misconceptions. In order to lessen the possibility that erroneous beliefs will lead
state legislators to single out politically unpopular recipients of
assistance for harsh treatment, Congress must clearly authorize States
to impose conditions of eligibility different from the federal standards. 9
Clear-statement requirements may be supported by a variety of
rationales, some of which are adverted to by Justice Marshall. First, where
the policies which the Court perceives to be central to a statutory scheme
would be put at risk by the adoption of one construction arguably supported by text and proper context, the Court should be reluctant to adopt
that construction absent "clear and unambiguous" language for fear of
significantly, though perhaps mistakenly, undermining the scheme." In
" See Note, The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 41, at 643 (noting the tilt toward
weighting state interests more heavily in the balance in preemption analysis). Cf 413 U.S.
at 413
([Preemption] could impair the capacity of the state government to deal effectively with the critical problem of mounting welfare costs and the increasing
financial dependency of many of its citizens. New York has a legitimate interest in encouraging those of its citizens who can work to do so, and thus
contribute to the societal well-being in addition to their personal and family
support. To the extent that the Work Rules embody New York's attempt to
promote self-reliance and civic responsibility, to assure that limited state welfare
funds be spent on behalf of those genuinely incapacitated and most in need,
and to cope with the fiscal hardship enveloping many state and local governments, this Court should not lightly interfere. The problems confronting our
society in these areas are severe, and state governments, in cooperation with
the Federal Government, must be allowed considerable latitude in attempting
their resolution.).
"9413 U.S. at 431-32 (footnotes omitted).
' In Dublino, Justice Marshall was concerned that "Congress' dual interests in
guaranteeing the integrity of the family and in maximizing the potential for employment
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short, an issue may appear so important and the risk of misunderstanding
so significant that the Court may desire direction from Congress before
accepting a proposed interpretation." While a subversion of actual congressional intent might thus occur, it would be in the name of ensuring
that the Court was in fact serving the legislative will.
Moreover, the demand that Congress speak with special clarity is a
way to ensure that Congress has not taken action trenching upon what
the Court perceives to be important constitutional or well-established nonconstitutional principles or policies inadvertently or, more significantly,
without sufficient consideration. "Inadvertent" suggests again that, before
it enforces a particular interpretation, the Court wants to be absolutely
certain that its perception of the legislative intent is correct. For example,
small changes in an elaborate statutory structure may appear to the Court
to have far-reaching effects not perceived by even the most attentive
legislator or legislative draftsman.
Yet in some cases Congress may have been aware, if only dimly, of
changes wrought by its work and the impact on important interests,
whether those interests have their source directly or remotely in constitutional law, statutory schemes, or the opinions of common law courts which
over- the years have "labored to discern and articulate a great number
of principles of social relations."-" Forcing Congress to directly and expressly address an issue will assure that it does so "in a form which tends
to focus its public responsibility for the action."' Congress is thus given
the opportunity for "sober second thought"' which can occur in a context in which all affected interests will at least have an opportunity to
have their say.
Other than protecting policies and principles which the Court finds to
be deeply embedded in the legal system, the remand to Congress can
be used to force the legislature to reconsider whether tasks assigned to
the courts can in fact be appropriately handled by them." Moreover, where
of recipients of public assistance" could be threatened by a construction of the Social Security
Act which would permit the New York Work Rules to operate. Id. at 428-29.
sI Cf. MISHKIN & MORRIS, supra note 46, at 510 (1965) ("[Ilsn't it desirable in any event to
have a 'presumption' that Congress has not in any specific case sought to [infringe upon
constitutionally protected values]? In order to minimize the number of such infringements
which might result from misconstruction of Congressional purpose?").
" See HART & SACKS, supra note 21, at 1240-41. See also Wellington, Common Law Rules
and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 264
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Wellington]; Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretationand
the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 1547, 1560
(1963[hereinafter cited as Wellington & Albert].
MISHKIN & MORRIS, supra note 46, at 510. See also Wellington & Albert, supra note 52,
at 1560-61, 1563 n.50.
The phrase is Chief Justice Stone's; see Stone, The Common Law in the United States,
50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 25 (1936) (referring to judicial review of official action).
See Wellington & Albert, supra note 52, at 1561-62; Bickel & Wellington, Legislative
Purpose and the JudicialProcess: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 30-34 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as Bickel & Wellington].
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Congress has attempted to delegate to the judiciary the resolution of
politically sensitive issues which Congress is institutionally capable of
resolving but intentionally or unintentionally avoided, a clear-statement
barrier to the delegation allegedly can be invoked.56
The "remand" to Congress in such circumstances is "compatible with
due respect for the peculiar powers and competences of both institutions
[legislature and judiciary]. '5 7 Requiring Congress to confront certain issues
permissibly recalls Congress to its duty as the principal, electorally responsible policy-making institution in the three branch scheme.55 In cases
where, for example, it is argued that federal law displaces state law absent
the requisite clear statement of intent to preempt, traditional solicitude
for protection of state interests and functions 9 combines with a desire
to avoid politically sensitive reallocation of the federal/state balance of
power.' These support a remand to Congress to assure that such displacement is determined in a forum, the national legislature, where the states'
interests are in fact represented.6
The concluding portion of Justice Marshall's explication of the bases
for his clear-statement requirement in the Dublino case may represent
either a version of one of the traditional rationales for such methodology
or the suggestion of an approach more directly at odds with legislative
supremacy. He seems to be saying that, in order to protect a class of
individuals which lacks sufficient political strength at the state level, the
Court should intervene on its behalf, and despite any intent which Congress may have had in enacting the WIN program, interpret the statute
in such a way as to protect that class's interests from the action of hostile
state legislators.62 The Court has previously suggested that where prejudice exists against a particular group which "tends seriously to curtail
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
See Wellington & Albert, supra note 52, at 1562-63.
5 Bickel & Wellington, supra note 55, at 34-35 (suggesting that the technique should
be limited to issues "close to, but not quite constitutional ones").
I See Wellington & Albert, supra note 52, at 1563, 1566. Cf. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH 160-61 (1962)
(The doctrine of delegation is concerned with the sources of policy, with the
crucial joinder between power and broadly based democratic responsibility,
bestowed and discharged after the fashion of representative government ..

. When should the Court recall the legislature to its own policy-making function? Obviously the answer must lie in the importance of the decision left
to the administrator or other official ....
The more fundamental the issue,
the nearer it is to principle, the more important it is that it be decided in
the first instance by the legislature).
See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981). See also Wechsler,
supra note 47.
1 See Wellington & Albert, supra note 52, at 1563-64.
Q See Wechsler, supra note 47. See also Stewart, The Development ofAdministrative and
Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw in JudicialReview of Environmental Decision-Making: Lessons
from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOwA L. REv. 713, 741 (1977).
C2

413 U.S. at 431-32.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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protect minorities, ' 6 3 a more searching judicial scrutiny for
constitutionality may be justified." The clear-statement requirement
invoked by Justice Marshall in Dublino might have been an attempt to
force Congress to undertake a sober second thought in view of the
misconceptions that might result in irresistible political pressure on state
legislators."
In addition, Justice Marshall's invocation of clear-statement principles
could have been a way to avoid having to decide the validity of the state
program on equal protection or due process grounds." On the other hand,
to the extent that reliance on a clear-statement requirement rooted in
the judiciary's responsibility for the protection of a particularly
misunderstood minority goes beyond this, it arguably trespasses to an
unacceptable degree on the legitimate legislative sphere, exalting judicial
over legislative policy making in disregard of the appropriate division
of functions between article III courts and Congress.' This is the danger
of a clear-statement approach: judges may find in it an invitation to enforce their own values and policies in preference to those adopted by the
electorally responsible branch."
In sum, clear statement requirements can serve a variety of purposes.
Their use is allegedly consistent with legislative supremacy in the sense
that theoretically, 9 Congress may, if it wishes, express its desires in sufficiently explicit terms that the judiciary has no choice but to obey.
However, practically speaking, limitations on congressional time,"6 as well
as political constraints, may foreclose such a response. Moreover, the

4 Id.
Cf. supra text accompanying notes 52-54. Justice Marshall's reasoning is similar to
that of Bickel and Wellington in justifying the result in United States v. Witkovich, 353
U.S. 194 (1957)(construing narrowly a statute requiring aliens against whom deportation
orders were outstanding to give under oath certain information about themselves). Those
commentators noted that in that case "[tjhe Court was dealing with. . . persons who are
not represented in the political process and to whose rights the Court might well be particularly alert." Bickel and Wellington, supra note 55, at 32.
See 413 U.S. at 432 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("When across-the-board adjustments like
those are made, legislators cannot single out especially unpopular groups for discriminatory
treatment."); id. at n.12 ("That the possibility of treatment that is so discriminatory as
to be unconstitutional is not insubstantial is shown by the Court's brief discussion of the
jurisdiction of the District Court .... "}.
I Cf. Sandalow, JudicialProtection of Minorities,75 MICH. L. REV. 1162 (1977). First, difficulties encountered by Justice Marshall's apparent reliance on the CaroleneProductsfootnote include the fact that he expressly relies on obstacles to protection of the favored
class via the political process, not on the national level, but on the state level, and yet
it is congressional intent that is at issue in Dublino. Second, the definition of protected
classes especially deserving of judicial protection is far from clear; thus, it arguably leaves
too much room for judicial policy making in disregard of legislative prerogatives. See, e.g.,
J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 619-23 (1978) (classifications based
on wealth generally do not involve a more stringent test for validity).
See Wellington & Albert, supra note 52, at 1559 n.41.
" See Fiss, supra note 8, at 18.
70 See Note, Intent, supra note 16, at 905-06.
11
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existence of clear-statement requirements may cause a court "to reject
or ignore at least a portion of congressional intent as that intent is derived
from legislative purposes."71 In support of doing so the courts invoke,
among other justifications, the need for caution to avoid mistakenly undermining important congressional policies, and the need to force Congress
to directly confront an issue and thus reinforce what is perceived as the
appropriate allocation of institutional responsibilities between the
legislature and the courts. While the remand function may defensibly recall
Congress to its policy-making duties and thus respect the essence of the
separation of powers, judicial erection of clear-statement barriers on the
basis of what a court considers to be wise or fair public administration
cannot so easily lay claim to legitimacy in terms of the constitutional allocation of power. Requirements of clear statement resting solely on the
Justices' individual policy predilections and their hostility to congressional
programs may be open to severe criticism as unacceptable transgressions
beyond the judiciary's appropriate sphere of action.
B. The Statutory Jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts
The Act of 1875 [the grant of general federal question jurisdiction"2 ]
is broadly phrased, but it has been continuously construed and limited
in the light of the history that produced it, the demands of reason
and coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy that have
emerged from the Act's function as a provision in the mosaic of federal
judiciary legislation. It is a statute, not a Constitution, we are
expounding.
Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co. 3
The federal district courts are tribunals whose subject matter jurisdiction is limited both by the Constitution74 and by Congress. 5 Justice
Frankfurter, himself a preeminent student of the area," obliquely refers
to this fundamental principle in the concluding portion of the excerpt from
his opinion in the Romero case quoted above. While article Ill of the
Constitution77 describes the types of cases and controversies78 whose
disposition Congress may vest in "Tribunals inferior to the Supreme
Court" created pursuant to article I, the national legislature constituSee Wellington & Albert, supra note 52, at 1559.
' Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980).
71 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959) (opinion by Frankfurter, J.).
71 U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2.
,-Id. art. I, § 8.
11See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928).
T U.S. CONST. art. III.
- Id. § 2.
71 Id. art. I, § 8,cl. 9.
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tionally possesses the discretion to assign to the courts of its creation
as little or as much of that judicial business as it deems desirable." Vesting
in Congress, whose composition is protective of state interests,' the power
to determine whether lower federal courts should exist and what the extent of their subject matter reach should be represented a compromise.
The solution attempted to satisfy those concerned with not only excessive
federal displacement of the states' dispute-settling function, but also the
cost to the national government of maintaining a separate set of tribunals
and the expense to litigants in litigating in perhaps inconveniently located
national courts.2
Accordingly, where Congress has expressly denied the lower federal
courts jurisdiction in a particular class of case, the Supreme Court has
upheld the limitation and acknowledged the paramount authority of the
legislature in this area.' At the same time, however, there are instances
where an express grant of jurisdiction supported federal adjudication,
but the Court permitted refusal to exercise that jurisdiction for a variety
of reasons,84 despite suggestions in some cases that there was no such
discretion granted to the courts.' Moreover, there are instances where,
on one view, jurisdiction appeared not to have been affirmatively authorized by Congress and yet its exercise was sustained by the Court.8 This
occurred in the face of substantial prior authority to the effect that the
federal courts must look to statutory law as warrant for their authority
and cannot go beyond the jurisdiction thus legislatively conferred.'

See, e.g., REDISH, supra note 13,
81 See Wechsler, supra note 47.

at 21-24.

Goldberg, The Influence of ProceduralRules on Federal Jurisdiction,28 STAN. L. REv.
395, 439 n.257 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Goldberg].
I See, e.g., Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8How.) 441 (1850) (involving a provision of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 vesting diversity jurisdiction in the lower federal courts but excepting from
the grant suits where diversity was created by assignment of promissory notes.
I See, e.g., Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assoc. Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981)
(opinion by Rehnquist, J.) ("Principle of comity" barred damage suit under 42 U.S.C. S 1938
against various county officials for allegedly unconstitutional administration of a state tax
system); see also C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS §§ 52, 52A (3d ed.
1976). Reasons for such abstention include avoiding of a federal constitutional question
where the case may be disposed of based on questions of state law, avoiding of needless
conflict with the administration by astate of its own affairs, leaving to the states resolution of unsettled questions of state law, easing the congestion of the federal court docket,
id. at 218, as well as, "equity, comity, and federalism." See REDISH, supra note 13, at 291.
1 See, e.g., Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 39-40 (1909). See also Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assoc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 119-25 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring,
and arguing that the absention cases referred to in note 84 supra are largely examples
not of the denial of jurisdiction but of the exercise of the power of a court of equity to
refuse to give relief).
' See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (pendent claim jurisdiction). See infra text accompanying notes 154-92 for the discussion of this case along with
proposition set forth.
',See, e.g., Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845). See also Forrester, The Nature
of a "Federal Question", 16 TUL. L. REv. 362, 363 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Forrester].
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Regardless, the constitutional allocation of power to Congress respecting
the scope of the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
dictates that the appropriate starting point for an analysis regarding the
propriety of, and necessity for, the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in a particular case is what has aptly been described by Justice
Frankfurter as "the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation."8 The tiles
in that "mosaic" consist, for example, of the statutory grants of specific
parts of the constitutional grant of judicial power respecting "[c]ases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority."89 These include sections 1337,1 1338,"' 1339,92 and 134093 of
the Judicial Code, as well as the grants of subject matter jurisdiction
found in many federal statutes which expressly create rights of action,
both civil and criminal." A specialized grant of the constitutional jurisdiction in "Controversies... between Citizens of different States 8' 5 is found
in the provision for statutory interpleader.9 ' Resting alongside these,
however, are the jurisdictional centerpieces of the general federal question grant in section 13311 and the general diversity grant in section 1332. 98
While the broad outlines of the jurisdictional "mosaic" are the work
of successive Congresses since 1789, the judiciary has been the craftsman
responsible for creating the fine detail of this pattern. 9 As Justice
Frankfurter candidly admitted in Romero,"' in this task the courts have
relied not only on the history of the enactments and any discernible
legislative intent, but also on certain policies of judicial creation deemed
consistent with the declared will of Congress. The parameters of each
statutory grant have, moreover, not been drawn in isolation but rather

" 358 U.S. at 379.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
9328 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (civil actions "arising under any Act of
Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and
monopolies").
9128 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1976) (civil actions "arising under any Act of Congress relating
to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks").
n 28 U.S.C. S 1339 (1976) (civil actions "arising under any Act of Congress relating to
the postal service").
13 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (Supp. IV 1980) (civil actions "arising under any Act of Congress
providing for internal revenue, or revenue from imports or tonnage except matters within
the jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade").
"' See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. S 7413(b) (Supp. I 1977) (federal enforcement); id. 5 7604(a) (Supp.
I 1977) (citizen suits), both dealing with actions under the Clean Air Act.
"

U.S. CONsT. art. III,

§ 2,

cl. 1.

28 U.S.C. 5 1335(a) (1976) (imposing only a "minimum diversity" requirement, that is,
diversity of citizenship between any two adverse claimants).
17 28 U.S.C.
1331 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
28 U.S.C. 1332 (1976).
" Cf DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 26-27 (analogizing court to artisan "reconstructing" a
damaged vase).
. 358 U.S. at 379. See supra text accompanying note 73 quotation.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:211

in relation to the other statutes vesting jurisdiction in the lower federal
courts."'
Of all the grants of subject matter jurisdiction, the most significant
for present purposes is section 1331, the judicial treatment of which filustrates both the cognitive and creative aspects of statutory interpretation.
Not until 1875 did section 1331 appear in the pattern of judiciary
legislation."2 While its language largely tracked the constitutional "arising
under" grant, 03 its scope was considerably narrowed by a complex gloss
requiring that a federal question bear a certain relationship to the
controversy... in addition to necessarily appearing on the face of a wellpleaded complaint.' 5
This restrictive interpretation, despite evidence of an intent suggested
in the scanty legislative history to grant the full reach of constitutional
"arising under" jurisdiction,' 6 has been attributed in part to the fear that
if the provision were given the constitutional breadth suggested by its
language, the flood of business into the federal courts would be "fatal
to the peer status of the state courts."'0 7 Arguably the representation
of the States' interests in the national legislature 0 suggested to the courts
that it was unlikely that Congress in 1875 intended such a result. 9
,0, In Romero, for example, the Court concluded that section 1331 could not support jurisdiction over maritime claims rooted in federal law which otherwise fell within section 1333
of the Judicial Code. 28 U.S.C. S 1333 (1976).
,o Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
,0 The statute as originally enacted referred to "ali suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity ... arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority." § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (emphasis added).
The constitutional grant extends the judicial power "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their authority." U.S. CONsT. art III,§ 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added). The Supreme
Court recently reitered that the constitutional grant of "arising under" jurisdiction is broader
than federal question jurisdiction under section 1331. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank
of Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1962, 1972 (1983).
104 See, e.g., Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridan, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). (The right or immunity created by federal law must be an "essential element" of the plaintiffs cause of
action). See generally REDISH, supra note 13, at 64-71.
105 See Louisville and Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). See generally REDISH,
supra note 13, at 72-77. For a recent reiteration of these requirements, see Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2846-47 (1983).
'" See Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157,
160 (1953).
...London, "FederalQuestion" Jurisdiction-A Snare and a Delusion, 57 MICH. L. REV.

835, 839-40 (1959) [hereinafter cited as London].
The "arising under" grant in article III, § 2 had been interpreted with great expansiveness
in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824), where Chief
Justice Marshall declared that whenever the question of the construction of the Constitution or laws of the United States formed an "ingredient" of a case, Congress could vest
jurisdiction over such a case in the lower federal courts. In Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263
(1934), the Court noted that in construing section 1331, "[d]ue regard" had to be paid to
"the rightful independence of state governments." Id. at 270.
108

See Wechsler, supra note 47.

See also London, supra note 107, at 840 ("[T]o impute to Congress such a radical change
of policy with respect to the distribution of power between the state and national govern1o9
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On the other hand, a clear-statement policy based on a concern for the
position of the state courts may have played a part in the result. Given
the significant intrusion on state interests threatened by a sweeping interpretation of the general federal question grant, the Court may have
opted for a narrow construction either to avoid mistaking Congress' real
intent or to give the legislature a chance for sober second thought'
regarding the desirability of changing the traditional federal/state balance
of power.
Yet other explanations for the judicial narrowing of section 1331 have
been offered. Concern over federal docket congestion resulting from an
expansive reading is frequently suggested as having been a controlling
factor,"' concern perhaps not entirely of judicial creation." 2 Interrelated
with that may have been a desire to avoid flooding the federal courts
with cases of minimal national interest and having to decide the volume
of issues of state law that would be presented for decision if Chief Justice
Marshall's constitutional interpretation of the "arising under" grant in
the Osborn case"' were adopted."' As Professor Mishkin said, "If Congress, in full awareness of the situation, had unequivocally called for such
a result, then it would be the duty of the courts to obey. But, short of
that, only blind subservience to form would choose such a course when
confronted (as Congress was not) with the consequences it would entail."'
Certainly a policy of limiting the number of cases heard under section
1331 so as to ensure a high quality of decision-making in those
controversies having a significant national interest,"' is entirely defensible
ments ought to require far stronger evidence of congressional intent than was available.").
It should also be noted that the interpretation of constitutional grants of jurisdiction
has implicitly been sensitive to overbroad intrusions on the states' ability to provide for
the determination of controversies in their courts, a power reserved to them by the Constitution. For example, a "case" within the meaning of article III has been defined, in one
context, as requiring a "common nucleus of operative fact" uniting the various claims
presented. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (involving so-called
pendent claim jurisdiction where a plaintiff has two "claims" against the same defendant
only one of which could by itself be the basis of a federal court action.) Whether the Gibbs
test is the exclusive way of defining the outer contours of a constitutional "case" is not
clear. See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).
1,0 See Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdictionof FederalQuestions, 90 U. PA. L. REV.
639, 643 (1942) (suggesting that the 1875 bill may have been "sneak" legislation) [hereinafter
cited as Chadbourn & Levin].
"I See, e.g., Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 110, at 659, 673; Forrester, supra note 87,
at 379 n.61 ("Its principle was an arbitrary creation of the federal courts, at a time of
expanding jurisdiction and congested dockets, to restrict their own jurisdiction in order
to limit the number of cases coming before them.").
"I See Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 110, at 643 (notes that part of debate on 1875
bill dwelt on concern regarding overcrowded dockets).
", See supra note 107.
"' See Mishkin, supra note 106, at 162-63.
115 Id. at 162.
Il See also Goldberg, supra note 82, at 457-58. The author also makes the point that judicial
construction of subject matter grants involves a "balancing process" which "entails assessing
and comparing federal and state incentives to have cases litigated before their own judges
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and consistent with, if not demanded by, the overall structure of the
statutory jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The more specific grants
of that power, such as section 1343,11 along with the various grants enacted
in statutes which expressly create rights to sue for violation of their
substantive provisions," 8 arguably establish docket priorities for the
federal courts. Section 1331 is largely a residual grant intended to cover
those matters not falling within the specific grants."9 In fashioning the
contours of section 1331, therefore, the courts should be sensitive to the
impact their action may have on what Congress has perceived to be
matters particularly deserving of attention by the national judicial
tribunals.
The courts have arguably treated section 1331 as a general delegation
of power to fashion their own jurisdiction in areas where issues of federal
law may be implicated while at the same time paying appropriate
deference to countervailing state interests and seeking to avoid undermining the judicial agenda established by the more specific subject matter
grants. 20 In short, section 1331 can be seen as a delegation of law-making
power in the procedural area that has its analogue in the substantive
sphere in the Sherman Antitrust Act. 2 '
and juries in their own procedural systems, as well as the federal interest in maintaining
the federal caseload at a manageable level." Id. at 454 n.333. See also Cohen, The Broken
Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" under Federal Law, 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 890, 905-16 (1967) (suggesting that the Courts' treatment of section 1331 may have
been influenced by concerns regarding federal workload, the need for sympathetic hearing
of certain issues and the existence of federal expertise).
28 U.S.C. S 1343 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)(civil rights actions).
, See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. S 187 (1976) (suits for unfair labor practices). Jurisdictional provisions such as 28 U.S.C. S 1337 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (actions "arising under" Acts regulating
commerce) and 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976) (actions "arising under" Acts of Congress relating
to patents and copyrights) are grants of intermediate specificity functioning as large scale
delegations of law-making power in the manner of section 1331. See infra text accompanying
notes 120-24. Unlike section 1331 they are limited to certain defined subject matter areas
and thereby create a docket priority over actions which are based solely on the purely
residual provision, section 1331. Arguably, however, they should not be seen as in all cases
establishing docket priorities of the same significance as those created by the even more
specific grants found in statutes which expressly create rights of action.
119 That such is Congress' current view of the function of section 1331 was confirmed
in the recent amendment to that provision, Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, § 2(a), 94 Stat. 2369, which finally abolished the jurisdictional amount requirement. See S. REP. No. 96-827, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980) ("Because
of the many specialized jurisdictional statutes already discussed, only a few types of cases
will be involved. These include principally suits arising under federal common law, certain
challenges to state and local action violative of federal statutes or regulations, and several
types of miscellaneous cases") (footnotes omitted); HR. REP. No. 96-1461, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1980) ("an unfortunate gap still exists in the statutory jurisdiction of the Federal
courts.") See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 549 n.17 (1972) ("A series
of particular statutes grant jurisdiction, without regard to amount in controversy in virtually all areas that otherwise would fall under the general federal question statute.").
"I See supra note 116. Cf.Garvey, The Limits of Ancillary Jurisdiction,57 TEx. L. REV.
697, 720 (1979) (dealing with the grant of diversity jurisdiction).
121DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 240-41. See also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc.,
451 U.S. 630, 643 (1981) (noting that the first two sections of the Sherman Act forbidding
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In fact all statutory grants of jurisdiction delegate, intentionally or
unintentionally, to a greater or lesser degree, law-making power to the
courts."M Of course, as to each of those, there was presumably a specific
type of case (in terms of issues and parties involved) encompassed by
the grant which was within the actual contemplation of those members
of Congress sponsoring and voting for the statute, regardless of whatever
other types of cases might come within the literal language used. Less
likely, though still possible, Congress may have formed an intent that
a particular type or types of controversy not be covered by the statute
though they might fit within the parameters of the language actually
employed. At the same time, it is extremely unlikely that the enacting
Congress as a body, or any of its members, formed an intent regarding
the application of the statute to the multifarious combinations of issues
and/or parties which the literal meaning of the language employed might
arguably encompass."M It is that stark fact that shows the interpretative
task to be at least as creative as cognitive."'
Viewing federal jurisdictional grants in this manner is relevant in
various ways to the issues of pendent jurisdiction, implied rights of action,
and federal common law to be discussed later. At this point, however,
only several implications of this conceptual approach need to be examined.
There is much talk in the cases expressing concern regarding improper
"expansion" of the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts through
broad interpretations of jurisdictional provisions. For example, in Snyder
v. Harris,25 holding that separate and distinct claims of plaintiff class
members in federal diversity actions could not be aggregated to meet
the requisite jurisdictional amount in controversy, the Supreme Court
observed that "[i]f there is a present need to expand the jurisdiction of
those courts we cannot overlook the fact that the Constitution specifically
vests that power in the Congress, not in the courts."'26 There is no
question, of course, that the more generous the gloss placed on those
grants, thereby enlarging the number of different types of cases falling
within them, the larger will be the number of cases crowding the courts'
dockets. If the Court could pinpoint an intent by Congress to bar the
contracts and combinations in restraint of trade constitute a delegation of power to the
courts to make law).
'1 Cf DICKERSoN, supranote 2, at 13-33. See, e.g., Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) (refusing to allow aggregation of claims to meet jurisdictional amount under S 1332 based on,
inter alia, fear of mounting caseload as well as the number of state law issues which would
be presented).
'- See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 871 (2d ed. 1973) (noting that the 1875 "Act was
a Senate amendment to a House bill relating only to the removal jurisdiction and was
hurriedly enacted at the close of a session without substantial debate.") [hereinafter cited
as HART & WECHSLER].
"'

See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
394 U.S. 332 (1969).
Id. at 341-42.
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type of controversy at issue from the federal courts, it would obviously
be improper to ignore that expression of legislative will. 127 It is likely
however, that no such intent can be discerned and, as argued above,128
it is to a large degree within the courts' discretion whether or not to
choose the construction of the statute which favors adjudication of the
case, assuming, of course, that the limits of the language used by Congress in the grant are respected.'29 The factors motivating such a choice
are not always candidly admitted.3 0
Other than expansions in federal jurisdiction brought about by generous
constructions of jurisdictional grants, it has also been suggested that
jurisdictional "expansion" occurs when the federal courts recognize a
private right to sue for legal or equitable relief on account of alleged violation of a federal statute' absent congressional creation of such a cause
of action. Justice Powell's analysis is particularly significant. In his dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago"'3 he noted: "When
Congress chooses not to provide a private civil remedy, federal courts
should not assume the legislative role of creating such a remedy and
thereby enlarge their jurisdiction.""'3 Later in the opinion he elaborated
on his objection:
Because a private action implied from a federal statute has as an
element the violation of that statute ... the action universally has
been considered to present a federal question over which a federal
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, when a federal
court implies a private action from a statute, it necessarily expands
the scope of its federal-question jurisdiction."'
"Implication," he argues, "extends [the court's] authority to embrace a
dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve.""' 5 This "conflicts with
the authority of Congress under Art. III to set the limits of federal
36
jurisdiction.""
There is no question that, as in the case of expansive interpretation
See supra text accompanying notes 22-26 & 68-82.
See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
" Where two or more jurisdictional provisions may arguably apply on the basis of their
literal language, context may suggest, if not necessarily the existence of a specific congressional intent against invocation of one as opposed to another, then at least the
appropriateness of reliance on one rather than another. See infra text accompanying note 377.
..In Snyder the Court did note concern over the increased federal caseload along with
the infusion of state law issues. 394 U.S. at 340-41. That case has also been explained as
an attempt to indirectly impede "the use of procedural rules with which [the Court] has
become disenchanted." Goldberg, supra note 82, at 399 & n.11.
"'
12

"' See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (suit based on title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).

Id.

132

Id. at 730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 746 n.17.
,3' Id. at 746.
"3 Id. at 747. See also Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div., 457 U.S. 15, 29-30 (1982) (Powell
& O'Connor, JJ., concurring).
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of jurisdictional provisions, judicial recognition of private rights of action
may significantly increase the number of cases presented for federal
adjudication, though there is some question whether this has yet
occurred.' 1 But Justice Powell's objection appears to be of a different
nature. On one level, his objection seems to assume that section 1331
describes the cases within the subject matter reach of the federal courts
more rigidly than in fact it does. Only on such a view does it make sense
for him to object to assumption of jurisdiction over disputes which "Congress has not assigned" to the courts.' 8 But, as noted above, 1 9 section
1331 is a residual provision which largely leaves it up to the courts to
determine the scope of their jurisdiction as long as there is an element
of federal law presented. 4 ' As Justice Powell himself appears to admit,
in cases like Cannon the plaintiff is squarely relying on a federal statute
to supply the definition of the defendant's liability. In terms of the role
of the federal element in relation to the plaintiffs claim for relief,' this
is the quintessential type of case falling within the general federal question
grant.
At the same time, given current jurisdictional doctrine, there is one
sense in which Justice Powell is perhaps correct in perceiving an
Atexpansion" of federal jurisdiction where a court itself creates the right
to sue for violation of a federal statute. Where a remedy is claimed for
violation of federal law, jurisdiction under section 1331 is present where
there exists, or after Bell v. Hood,"" there arguably exists," a federal
right and a federal remedy for that right.' For there to be federal ques13 See Pillai, Negative Implication: The Demise of PrivateRights of Action in the Federal
Courts, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 38 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Pillail.
"' He criticizes, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (state
created cause of action whose disposition turned on an issue of federal law) and implicitly
other cases and scholarly commentary which have taken a more pragmatic approach to
interpretation of section 1331. See, e.g., Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 653 (1963)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing cases and comments) along with authorities cited supra
note 116. His position may be that section 1331 applies only where Congress has created
both the right and the remedy unless the right has a constitutional origin. See infra text
accompanying notes 150-53. He fails, however, to support his analysis with any evidence
that his more restrictive view is demanded by the text or proper context of the general
federal question grant.
,' See supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
1
A similar argument obtains with regard to the somewhat more specific grants of
jurisdiction, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§1337, 1338 and 1339.
141 See REDISH, supra note 13, at 65-71.
1,,327 U.S. 678 (1946) (suit in the United States district court against agents of the FBI
for money damages for alleged unlawful arrests, searches and seizures in violation of the
fourth and fifth amendments).
"I In Bell the Court held that in cases seeking recovery directly under federal law a
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, rather than for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted, is appropriate only "where the alleged claim under the
Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous."
Id. at 681-83.
" In a recent dissent from the denial of certiorari, Justice Rehnquist appeared to suggest that even if the claim of a federal remedy for violation of the Constitution or federal
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tion jurisdiction in these circumstances the combination of section 1331
and the existence, or arguable existence, of a federal right for which there
is or may be a remedy is required. " 5 Judicial creation, or the willingness
to consider judicial creation, of a right on behalf of a particular person
to sue for damages caused by violation of statutory proscriptions thus
brings into existence, without congressional authorization, one of the prerequisites to federal subject matter jurisdiction. "'
Yet if there are separation of powers problems presented by judicial
recognition of implied rights of action, the more substantial difficulties
are on the substantive, not the procedural, level. That is, should the courts
be in the business of deciding whether and to what extent policies
established by the national legislature pursuant to its powers under article
I, exclusive of its power to create the lower federal courts, should be
advanced by remedies not brought into existence by the representatives
of the states and the people in Congress assembled? That Justice Powell
himself appreciated this is indicated by the comparative brevity of his
treatment in Cannon of the jurisdictional issue per se "7 when seen in relation to his discussion of the more substantive reasons. 8 why the Court
statute is entirely frivolous, the dismissal should be for failure to state a claim and not
for lack of jurisdiction. See Yazoo County Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982).
This suggests that he would not view judicial creation of implied rights of action as judicial
"expansion" of the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts even in the sense used
in the text. Since, according to his suggested approach, an action apparently could not
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction even if it were established that the
judiciary had no authority to create on its own a remedy for a statutory violation, the
judiciary would clearly not be enlarging its subject matter reach even if it assumes the
power to imply a remedy. In short, as long as a violation of federal law is clearly the basis
for any remedy requested, subject matter jurisdiction is present. Whether a remedy can
(or should) be granted is a separate matter. See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 37 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("it is analytically correct to view the question of jurisdiction
as distinct from that of the appropriate relief to be granted."). Even the Court in Bell
admitted that the "accuracy of calling ... dismissals [for immateriality or frivolousness]
jurisdictional has been questioned," 327 U.S. at 683, and it is unlikely that Congress has
mandated that they be so viewed. Cf. Yazoo County Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Suthoff, 454 U.S.
at 1158 (footnote) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
's
See London, supra note 107, at 855:
In order to determine, therefore, whether a case arises under federal law,
in the sense that the plaintiffs cause of action has been created by federal
law, the jurisdictional statute must be read in conjunction with the express
federal right under which the- plaintiff is claiming, and the two statutory provisions together then constitute the statutory predicate upon which federal
jurisdiction must rest.
"'
A similar analysis would appear applicable to cases where jurisdiction is premised
on the somewhat more specific grants of, e.g., 28 U.S.C. S 1337, 1338, 1339. Once recognized,
however, it is clear that even where both the duty and remedy are judicially created, the
case "arises under the ... laws . .. of the United States" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
S 1331. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1972). In implied right cases,
it is only the remedy which is judicially created since the relevant constitutional or statutory
provision defines the defendant's duty.
"7 441 U.S. at 746-47.
14 Id.
at 743-45, 747-49.
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should not continue on a course the "unconstitutionally" of which "has
now been made clear." '
It is further interesting to note that while Justice Powell argues that
judicial recognition of private rights to sue for violation of federal
statutory requirements infringes on the power of Congress to control the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, he apparently does not believe that
federal court assertion of jurisdiction over judicially created causes of
action arising directly under the Constitution, 50 whether the relief
requested be legal or equitable, is constrained to the same degree."' He
noted in Cannonthat "this Court's traditional responsibility to safeguard
constitutionally protected rights, as well as the freer hand we necessarily
have in the interpretation of the Constitution, permits greater judicial
creativity with respect to implied constitutional causes of action."'5, But
this hardly explains by itself why judicial creation of private rights of
action based on statute impermissibly intrudes on Congress's power to
limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts and yet judicial creation of constitutionally based causes does not. In both instances it would seem that
the judicial creation of the remedy is itself a prerequisite to jurisdiction
which thereby "expands" the statutory limits of the federal courts powers
"to embrace a dispute Congress has not assigned it to resolve."'5 3
By this review of the nature of the statutory grants of jurisdiction and
their relation to judicial recognition of rights of action, the stage has been
set for an examination of the real issues at stake in the three areas on
which this article focuses.
III.

PENDENT JURISDICTION

The question here, which it was not necessary to address in Gibbs
or Osborn,is whether by virtue of the statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, upon which petitioner's principal claim against the
treasurer rests, Congress has addressed itself to the party as to whom
jurisdiction pendent to the principal claim is sought.
Aldinger v. Howard"

Id. at 742 (quoting the famous remarks of Justice Brandeis in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938)).
15 See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 25-30 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring in a case
holding a damage action was available in federal court against federal officials for violations of the eighth amendment).
Il Justice Powell did indicate, without elaboration in Carlson, however: "In my view,
the Court's willingness to infer federal causes of action that cannot be found in the Constitution or in a statute denigrates the doctrine of separation of powers [citing his dissent
in Cannon]." Id. at 29. See also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 746 n.17 (referring to implication from
constitutional sources).
'' 441 U.S. at 733 n.3.
15

Id.

at 746.

427 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (opinion by Rehnquist, J.) (emphasis in original).
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A. From Gibbs to Aldinger
Pendent jurisdiction, as it has come to be developed by the courts,
denotes a situation where "claims" which could not be sued upon independently in federal court because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction bear a "sufficient relationship" to other "claims" as to which there
is an express grant of subject matter jurisdiction such that the federal
court feels justified in adjudicating the entire controversy. "Pendent
party," as distinguished from "pendent claim," jurisdiction is present
where the pendent claim joins additional parties who, in the absence of
the "sufficient relationship," could not be sued alone in the federal courts
on that claim.
The modern constitutional parameters for this jurisdictional concept
were established in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,'5 where Justice Brennan for the Court observed:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists whenever
there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution, the Laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority ....

"

U.S. Const., Art. III, S 2, and the relationship be-

tween that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the
entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional "case."
...

The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus

of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal
or state character, a plaintiffs claims are such that he would ordinarily
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming
substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts

to hear the whole.' 56
He then noted that the decision to assume pendent claim jurisdiction was
within the discretion of the trial court,'- and that one of the factors to
be weighed against the exercise of that discretion was the avoidance of
"[n]eedless decisions of state law,"'5'8 both as a "matter of comity and to
promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law."'59
What Justice Brennan did not directly address was the statutory basis,
if any, for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Dicta in such cases as
Sheldon v. Sill' and Cary v. Curtis'' suggested that any assertion of
1 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (where suit was brought in federal court against a union asserting
a federal statutory claim under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947 and a claim under the common law of Tennessee, both arising out of alleged concerted union efforts to deprive the plaintiff of contractual and employment relationships
with coal mine owners).
IS Id. at 725 (footnotes omitted but emphasis from original).
Id. at 726.
158Id.
1 I9
Id.
' 49

U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850) (involving an express congressional denial of jurisdiction
in the case of assignees of promissory notes).
1 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845) (involving the express abolition of an action against a tax
collector for taxes wrongfully levied).
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jurisdiction must be directly founded upon a statute. However the wording
of the jurisdictional grant expressly invoked by the plaintiff in Gibbs,162
section 303(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,63 could
only with extreme difficulty be "construed" broadly enough to encompass
a parallel state law claim.164 This has apparently led some commentators
to suggest that Gibbs can or should be read as finding jurisdiction over
the federal claim premised on section 1331,165 rather than the jurisdictional provision in fact relied upon by the plaintiff, with the state law
claim being seen as merely part of a "civil action" within the meaning
of section 1331.166 Such a position obviously suggests that, in at least some
contexts, section 1331 is more than purely a residual jurisdictional grant.' 7
Moreover, if that was the Court's approach, there is the problem of reconciling its view of section 1331 in this context, which view seems to read
it as reaching to the constitutional limit, with the cases discussed
previously which have imposed a much narrower gloss on its wording.'68
Justice Brennan clearly acknowledged the latter line of precedent in his
reference to Gully v. FirstNationalBank."9 He expressly noted that "[t]he
question whether joined state and federal claims constitute one 'case' for
jurisdictional purposes is to be distinguished from the often equally
difficult inquiry whether any 'case' at all is presented."'' 6
To the extent that Gibbs implicitly did rely on section 1331 as the
statutory basis for pendent jurisdiction, perhaps the Court was laying
down the following proposition: as long as there is at least one nonfrivolous federal question presented in the manner demanded by the traditional narrow view of section 1331,'11 section 1331 can justifiably be
construed, at least in some contexts, to reach as far as the Constitution
permits in terms of hearing non-federal law claims. In short, it is one
162

383 U.S. at 720.

''

29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1964

Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason or [sic] any
violation of subsection (a) [i.e. commission of an unfair labor practice] of this
section may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject
to the limitations and provisions of section 185 of this title without respect
to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the
parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of suit.
18 Section 187(b) expressly seemed to give jurisdiction only over claimed unfair labor
practices as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1964).
'0 The $10,000 jurisdictional amount in effect under section 1331 at the time suit was
brought, 72 Stat. 415, would clearly have been satisfied.
' See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 123, at 921 ("Was it so clear as to go without saying
that the federal question statute confers jurisdiction of a scope equal to that of the constitutional grant"?); Currie, Pendent Parties,45 U. CHL L. REV.753, 754 (1978); Note, Federal
Pendent PartyJurisdictionand United Mine Workers v. Gibbs-FederalQuestion and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REV.194, 203 n.49 (1976).
See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
'" See supra text accompanying notes 102-15. See also Note, The Concept of Law-Tied
Pendent Jurisdiction:Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YALE LJ.627, 642 (1978).
189 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
170 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 n.12.
'

See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
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thing to say that federal court jurisdiction should not be sustained when
the federal question is at best "lurking in the background"'7 2 and presents
the prospect of flooding the national courts with cases of minimal national
13
interest where the more substantial issues are those of state law.' It
is quite a different matter where there is a non-frivolous federal question
directly present, particularly where Congress in an express grant of
jurisdiction such as section 303(b) has evidenced its interest in having
that issue litigated in the federal courts. The need to further the congressional policy of allowing vindication of federal rights in federal courts,
evidenced by the Act of 1875 and other jurisdictional grants, combines
with concerns of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants."''
Together they support a construction of section 1331 permitting the
assumption of jurisdiction where, absent the availability of pendent
jurisdiction, a party with state and federal claims might-on the basis
of economies in litigating-feel compelled to choose the one court, state
court, where it can bring the entire action." 5
Gibbs' focus on the constitutional, rather than the statutory, basis for
pendent claim jurisdiction apparently suggested to other commentators,
however, that such an exercise of power existed outside of any statutory
grant.' 8 In support of such a view is the discretionary nature of the
jurisdiction. As noted previously, though the general rule is subject to
quite a few exceptions, the-Supreme Court has occasionally remarked on
the mandatory nature of legislatively conferred subject matter
jurisdiction.'
The best that can be said of the situation after Gibbs is that the intraor extra-statutory nature of pendent claim jurisdiction was far from clear.
The matter was not clarified, for example, in Rosado v. Wyman,' 8 another
pendent claim case. There the plaintiffs attacked the New York Social
Service Law as both a violation of the equal protection clause' and, alternately, as incompatible with the federal Social Security Act. Jurisdiction
of the former claim was grounded on section 1343 of the Judicial Code.'80
The Court, through Justice Harlan, observed:
Since we conclude that the District Court properly exercised its
pendent jurisdiction, we have no occasion to consider whether, as urged
172

299 U.S. at 117.

I" See supra text accompanying notes 106-16.

a83 U.S. at 726.
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 123, at 922-23; Schenkier, EnsuringAccess to Federal
Courts: A Revised Rationale For Pendent Jurisdiction,75 Nw. U.L. REv. 245, 255 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Schenkier].
1,I See, e.g., Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction,77 COLUM. L. REv.
127, 134 & n.37 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Aldinger v. Howard].
'" See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-97 (1971). See also supra
text accompanying note 85.
171 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
'
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
28 U.S.C. S 1343 (1976).
17

" See
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by petitioners, this statutory claim satisfies the $10,000 amount-incontroversy requirement of the general federal jurisdiction provision,
28 U.S.C. § 1331, or whether it could be maintained under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3), which contains no amount-in-controversy limitation, as an
action "[to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law .
. . of any right, privilege or immunity secured by .. . any Act of
" "I
Congress providing for equal rights of citizens ...
Such language is, however, consistent with the view of pendent jurisdiction, where exercised, as existing outside the relevant statutory grants.
Four years later in Hagans v. Lavine,1" the Court was confronted with
somewhat similar substantive constitutional and statutory issues, with
subject matter jurisdiction over the former likewise based on section 1343.
This time Justice White wrote the opinion which noted:
Concededly, § 1343 authorizes a civil action to "redress the deprivation, under color of any State ... regulation . . . of any right ...
secured by the Constitution of the United States." Section 1343(3)
therefore conferred jurisdiction upon the District Court to entertain
the constitutional claim if it was of sufficient substance to support
federal jurisdiction. If it was, it is also clear that the District Court
could hear as a matter of pendent jurisdiction the claim of conflict
between federal and state law, without determining that the latter claim
in its own right was encompassed within 5 1343.112
It was necessary to rely on a pendent theory for the statutory claim
because the jurisdictional amount then required by section 1331 was not
8
The passage quoted provides some ambiguous
satisfied for that claim."
the
notion
that
the pendent claim fell outside the relevant
support for
jurisdictional ground expressly invoked in that case, that is section 1343.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Hagans is of particular
importance. His disagreement with the majority centered largely on his
differing evaluation of the "substantiality" of the constitutional claim and
the propriety of the exercise of discretion to hear the pendent statutory
claim." ' In his discussion of the jurisdictional issues raised, however, he
adverted to a statutory argument against the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over a claim arising under federal law which did not meet the $10,000
jurisdictional amount requirement of section 1331: "But the presence of
federal questions should not induce federal courts to expand their proper
jurisdiction. As previously noted, Congress, by requiring a minimum dollar
amount for federal question jurisdiction, made a legislative decision to
leave certain claims to state courts." 8 ' This comes close to saying that
Congress had expressly or impliedly told the federal courts not to exer-

"1 397 U.S. at 405 n.7.
182

415 U.S. 528 (1974).

at 536 (emphasis added).
See 415 U.S. at 553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

18 Id.
'

at 561.

18

Id.

"

Id. at 559.
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cise jurisdiction over the federal claim at issue. Under Sheldon v. Sill

7

such a congressional negative would be both constitutional and controlling
on the ability of the courts to exercise jurisdiction.
Yet Justice Rehnquist never made the foregoing argument in express
terms.'88 At one point he seemed to concede that if the equal protection
claim had been "substantial," there would have been power in the district
court to hear the statutory issue." He then moved to the issues of substantiality of the jurisdiction-conferring claim and the trial court's discretion.
The opportunity for a clarification of the statutory limitations on the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction was finally.. seized in Aldinger v.
Howard,9 ' another section 1983 action. There Justice Rehnquist was able
to expound his ideas in the opinion for the full Court, in a way which
appears to have set the terms for the Court's approach to issues of pendent jurisdiction. 92
B. Aldinger v. Howard: The Facts and Analysis of the
Nature of JurisdictionalGrants
Having been dismissed from her position in the office of the Spokane
County treasurer, allegedly for reasons substantively improper under
various constitutional provisions 9' and in a manner procedurally deficient
under the due process clause,"' the plaintiff sued various county officials
for injunctive relief and damages. Their liability was premised on the
Civil Rights Act of 1871"1' and subject matter jurisdiction over those claims
49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850), supra note 83.
See 415 U.S. at 559-60.
19 Id. at 559. ("Considerations of convenience and judicial economy may justify hearing
those claims when genuine federal business, as contrasted to weak claim intended merely
to secure jurisdiction, is before the federal court.").
190 In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), where pendent party jurisdiction
was attempted but, as a matter of discretion, refused, the Court, per Justice Marshall,
expressly noted without elaboration the statutory limits on federal court jurisdiction. Id.
at 715. See also Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (refusing to interpret
section 1332 to permit class members with claims falling below the jurisdictional amount
to join with named plaintiffs whose claims met that requirement, though the Court did
not deal with the issue in terms of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction). But see id. at 302-12
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (urging analysis in ancillary terms).
"'

,91427 U.S. 1 (1976).

19 See, e.g., Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (invoking
the Aldinger approach in the context of a claim by a plaintiff against a non-diverse thirdparty defendant in a suit based on section 1332).
'93 Specifically, the first, ninth and fourteenth amendments were involved. 427 U.S. at 4.
'9' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, S 1.
I's
42 U.S.C. S 1983 (1976), which reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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was based on its specific jurisdictional counterpart, section 1343(3) of the
Judicial Code. 9' Spokane County, whose sovereign immunity from suit
had allegedly been waived by Washington law which also provided for
its vicarious liability for tortious conduct of its officers, was joined as
an additional party defendant. The county could not have been sued alone
in federal court since there was no diversity between itself and the plaintiff nor was there substantive liability imposed on it directly by federal
statutory law which could have been the basis for jurisdiction founded
on section 1331 or on section 1343.19' Thus the purported rationale for
subject matter jurisdiction over that defendant was "pendent party"
jurisdiction.198
Justice Rehnquist in Aldinger expressly directed his attention to the
statutory limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts. In this regard, he appeared to accept a very expansive general
approach to the interpretation of those grants. At the same time, in
ultimately finding that pendent party jurisdiction was foreclosed, he relied
on a line of reasoning which suggested that a clear-statement requirement was functioning, at least with respect to the treatment of section
1343.
With respect to the question whether an exercise of pendent jurisdiction is properly seen as falling within or without the statutory grants,
Justice Rehnquist indicated that the former was the appropriate view.
He observed that:
Parties such as counties, whom Congress excluded from liability in
§ 1983, and therefore by reference in the grant of jurisdiction under
1343(3), can argue with a great deal of force that the scope of that
"civil action" over which the district courts have been given statutory
jurisdiction should not be so broadly read as to bring them back within
that power merely because the facts also give rise to an ordinary civil
action against them under state law....
[..
[T]he joinder of a municipal corporation, like the county here, for
purposes of asserting a state-law claim not within federal diversity
jurisdiction, is without the statutoryjurisdictionof the district court.'
In distinguishing Gibbs from Aldinger, he noted that the former did
not pose "the need for a further inquiry into the underlying statutory
grant of federal jurisdiction or a flexible analysis of concepts such as
'question,' 'claim,' and 'cause of action,' because Congress had not
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
overruled two years after Aldinger in Monell v. Department of Social Services
of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) stood as a barrier
to substantive liability of municipalities under section 1983 on the basis of its interpretation of the word "person" in that provision. The Court has, however, found that the general
analysis proposed in Aldinger survives the demise of Monroe. See Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-73 n.12 (1978). See also Symm v. United States, 439 U.S.
1105, 1109 n.4 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
,IR
See supra text accompanying note 155.
427 U.S. at 17 (emphasis supplied in part).
'

'' Until
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addressed itself by statute to this matter."2 0 In Gibbs, "Congress was
silent on the extent to which the defendant, already properly in federal
court under a statute, might be called upon to answer nonfederal questions or claims; the way was thus left open for the Court to fashion its
' While at first glance
own rules under the general language of Art. III."2"
these observations might be construed to suggest a conception of pendent jurisdiction as existing outside the jurisdictional grants, in context
they are consistent with the later analysis quoted above.0 2
What Rehnquist seemed to be saying was that in enacting the jurisdictional grant involved in Gibbs, Congress had not, understandably, considered the type of situation presented when a plaintiff with a federal
claim against a defendant wanted also to litigate a state-created claim
which was closely related in a factual sense. The relevant jurisdictional
grant did not, therefore, explicitly deal with this matter, though
presumably it was linguistically capable of being stretched to cover the
entire controversy.0 ' Acknowledging the nature of at least some of these
grants as de facto delegations of law-making power, within limits, to the
courts,0 4 Rehnquist viewed Gibbs as construing that delegation to extend
to the constitutional limit of the courts' pendent jurisdictional power.0 5
In short, in Gibbs Congress had formed no specific intent regarding the
particular jurisdictional issue there presented and the courts, in applying the underlying jurisdictional grants, could engage in law-making within
the broad contours of those grants which could be seen as limited only
by article III. Of course to the extent these statutes are construed in
Id at 13.
Id. at 15.
See supra text accompanying note 199.
s In Aldinger, Justice Rehnquist does not expressly indicate what statutory grant was
being "construed" in Gibbs. See supra text accompanying notes 162-64.
204 Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15 ("fashion its own rules"). Such rules would include criteria
applicable to the court's exercise of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over pendent matters. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
Declination of jurisdiction over a pendent claim as a matter of discretion should be compared with invocation of one of the abstention doctrines, supra note 84. The concerns
motivating each may be similar. Compare supra note 84 with supra text accompanying
notes 158-59. The issue of discretion to hear a pendent matter is reached only after it
is determined that there is constitutional power to hear the affiliated claim and there is
no congressional negative on the exercise of jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes
210-18. Thus, unless there is an affirmative congressional intent that the pendent claim
be heard, a rare case indeed, refusal to hear the claim as a matter of discretion will not
run afoul of congressional intent.
In an abstention case where the jurisdictional provision encompasses the claim only as
a matter of judicial "creation" and not "cognition," refusal to hear the matter will also
not usually run afoul of congressional intent. But where, as is more generally the case,
the claim is the type which Congress had specifically in mind when it enacted the jurisdictional provision, see supra text accompanying notes 122-24, the court's refusal to hear the
case, presumptively at least, flies in the face of congressional intent and thus bears a heavy
burden of justification.
25 Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15. See Schenkier, supra note 175, at 257.
21

202
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was based on its specific jurisdictional counterpart, section 1343(3) of the
Judicial Code." Spokane County, whose sovereign immunity from suit
had allegedly been waived by Washington law which also provided for
its vicarious liability for tortious conduct of its officers, was joined as
an additional party defendant. The county could not have been sued alone
in federal court since there was no diversity between itself and the plaintiff nor was there substantive liability imposed on it directly by federal
statutory law which could have been the basis for jurisdiction founded
on section 1331 or on section 1343.17 Thus the purported rationale for
subject matter jurisdiction over that defendant was "pendent party"
jurisdiction. 9 s
Justice Rehnquist in Aldinger expressly directed his attention to the
statutory limits on the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts. In this regard, he appeared to accept a very expansive general
approach to the interpretation of those grants. At the same time, in
ultimately finding that pendent party jurisdiction was foreclosed, he relied
on a line of reasoning which suggested that a clear-statement requirement was functioning, at least with respect to the treatment of section
1343.
With respect to the question whether an exercise of pendent jurisdiction is properly seen as falling within or without the statutory grants,
Justice Rehnquist indicated that the former was the appropriate view.
He observed that:
Parties such as counties, whom Congress excluded from liability in
5 1983, and therefore by reference in the grant of jurisdiction under
§ 1343(3), can argue with a great deal of force that the scope of that
"civil action" over which the district courts have been given statutory
jurisdiction should not be so broadly readas to bring them back within
that power merely because the facts also give rise to an ordinary civil
action against them under state law....
...[T]he joinder of a municipal corporation, like the county here, for
purposes of asserting a state-law claim not within federal diversity
jurisdiction, is without the statutoryjurisdictionof the district court."
In distinguishing Gibbs from Aldinger, he noted that the former did
not pose "the need for a further inquiry into the underlying statutory
grant of federal jurisdiction or a flexible analysis of concepts such as
'question,' 'claim,' and 'cause of action,' because Congress had not
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
Until overruled two years after Aldinger in Monell v. Department of Social Services
of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) stood as a barrier
to substantive liability of municipalities under section 1983 on the basis of its interpretation of the word "person" in that provision. The Court has, however, found that the general
analysis proposed in Aldinger survives the demise of Monroe. See Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-73 n.12 (1978). See also Symm v. United States, 439 U.S.
1105, 1109 n.4 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
188 See supra text accompanying note 155.
427 U.S. at 17 (emphasis supplied in part).
'
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addressed itself by statute to this matter. 21 11 In Gibbs, "Congress was
silent on the extent to which the defendant, already properly in federal
court under a statute, might be called upon to answer nonfederal questions or claims; the way was thus left open for the Court to fashion its
own rules under the general language of Art. III. ' ' 21 While at first glance
these observations might be construed to suggest a conception of pendent jurisdiction as existing outside the jurisdictional grants,
in context
22
they are consistent with the later analysis quoted above.
What Rehnquist seemed to be saying was that in enacting the jurisdictional grant involved in Gibbs, Congress had not, understandably, considered the type of situation presented when a plaintiff with a federal
claim against a defendant wanted also to litigate a state-created claim
which was closely related in a factual sense. The relevant jurisdictional
grant did not, therefore, explicitly deal with this matter, though
presumably it was linguistically capable of being stretched to cover the
entire controversy. 2 3 Acknowledging the nature of at least some of these
grants as de facto delegations of law-making power, within limits, to the
courts,2 14 Rehnquist viewed Gibbs as construing that delegation to extend
to the constitutional limit of the courts' pendent jurisdictional power.2 5
In short, in Gibbs Congress had formed no specific intent regarding the
particular jurisdictional issue there presented and the courts, in applying the underlying jurisdictional grants, could engage in law-making within
the broad contours of those grants which could be seen as limited only
by article III. Of course to the extent these statutes are construed in
Id. at 13.
2' Id. at 15.
202See

supra text accompanying note 199.
o In Aldinger, Justice Rehnquist does not expressly indicate what statutory grant was
being "construed" in Gibbs. See supra text accompanying notes 162-64.
" Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15 ("fashion its own rules"). Such rules would include criteria
applicable to the court's exercise of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over pendent matters. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-27.
Declination of jurisdiction over a pendent claim as a matter of discretion should be compared with invocation of one of the abstention doctrines, supra note 84. The concerns
motivating each may be similar. Compare supra note 84 with supra text accompanying
notes 158-59. The issue of discretion to hear a pendent matter is reached only after it
is determined that there is constitutional power to hear the affiliated claim and there is
no congressional negative on the exercise of jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes
210-18. Thus, unless there is an affirmative congressional intent that the pendent claim
be heard, a rare case indeed, refusal to hear the claim as a matter of discretion will not
run afoul of congressional intent.
In an abstention case where the jurisdictional provision encompasses the claim only as
a matter of judicial "creation" and not "cognition," refusal to hear the matter will also
not usually run afoul of congressional intent. But where, as is more generally the case,
the claim is the type which Congress had specifically in mind when it enacted the jurisdictional provision, see supra text accompanying notes 122-24, the court's refusal to hear the
case, presumptively at least, flies in the face of congressional intent and thus bears a heavy
burden of justification.
" Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15. See Schenkier, supra note 175, at 257.
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those jurisdictional grants." Justice Rehnquist arguably did not believe
that, at least with respect to actions where one claim came within the
express terms of section 1343, there was a need to rely on section 1331
to support pendent jurisdiction over a related state law claim. In the
absence of a congressional negative, the term "civil action" contained in
section 1343 had enough semantic leeway to theoretically embrace claims
based solely on state law as long as there was a constitutionally suffil
cient nexus (e.g., "common nucleus of operative fact")
' to the federal law
claim falling expressly within the literal language of section 1343.'
Moreover, since the abolition in 1980 of the $10,000 jurisdictional amount
requirement formerly found in section 1331,21 any linguistic difficulties
in fitting the pendent claim within the terms of a specific "arising under"
grant, as perhaps was the case in Gibbs,14 could be obviated by reliance
on section 1331 and its broad language, absent, of course, an express or
implied congressional negative. This assumes that section 1331 possesses
more than a purely residual nature in certain contexts.' 5 In the absence
of the congressional negative the full constitutional reach of pendent
jurisdiction is available to the courts within the jurisdictional grants.
Operating within these broad limits the courts can fashion jurisdictional
doctrine in response to those party-neutral values that should characterize
sound judicial administration.
Finally, while Aldinger dealt only with federal question jurisdiction,
presumably the same approach applies in the case of diversity jurisdiction under section 1332." Therefore, as long as there is diversity of citizenship between two parties whose interests are adverse to each other, and
the claims between any non-diverse parties bear the required constitutional nexus to the claims pending between the diverse parties, section
1332 can be construed to embrace the pendent claims, absent congressional intention to the contrary.'
For example, where jurisdiction is based on section 1343, there must be a claim of

the nature expressly described by that provision. Where section 1331 is expressly invoked,
a federal question must appear in the manner required by the traditional narrow reading

of that provision. See supra text accompanying notes 104-05.
22

United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, (1966).

See
See
"I See
See

427 U.S. at 17 (quoted in text supra note 199).
supra note 119.
supra text accompanying notes 162-64.
supra text accompanying notes 117-19.

28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
1 In State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court found
that "minimal diversity" satisfied the requirements of article III. Of course, in the case
where, for example, a plaintiff from New York sues two defendants, one from New Jersey
and one from New York, the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss,
7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), as elaborated by the courts and allegedly approved by Congress though subsequent reenactment of section.1332 without relevant change, would constitute a congressional negative against finding jurisdiction. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). This congressional negative partakes more of the

nature of the first type of negative intent described above. See supra text accompanying

note 214. See also Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), which found a con-
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Justice Rehnquist suggested that the approach in Aldinger, that is, the
search for a congressional negative, was limited to attempted assertions
of pendent party jurisdiction. 28 But, given the undoubted congressional
power to limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts recognized in
Sheldon v. Sill, the search for a congressional denial of jurisdiction is required whether pendent party or pendent claim jurisdiction is asserted.
Likewise, Rehnquist's conclusion that pendent jurisdiction, if exerciseable
at all, must fall within the statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction
invoked is hardly less applicable to situations where only pendent claim
jurisdiction is involved. 2 9 Finally, there would seem to be no reason to
distinguish assertions of so-called ancillary" from pendent jurisdiction
in terms of the required analysis."3
Several theories have been propounded to justify the Court's ability
to construe the jurisdictional grants in the broad fashion apparently accepted by the Rehnquist opinion in Aldinger.
a. The similarity of the language of various jurisdictional grants to that
of the Constitution is emphasized. 2 Such an argument is obviously not
available in the case of a grant like section 1343 which does not track
the "arising under" language of article HI. Moreover, even with respect
to sections 1331 and 1332, which do substantially conform to the constitutional phrasing, that similarity has not been found dispositive with respect
to congressional intent as evidenced by the relatively consistent interpretation of those provisions, though in other contexts, that has narrowed
them considerably from the constitutionally permitted scope.
b. With regard to those grants of subject matter power which have
their source in the constitutional "arising under" grant, the purpose of
Congress, which crystallized following the Civil War, was and continuously
has been, with minor exception as in the case of matters of small monetary
value, to assure a federal forum for the protection of federal rights.'
Without pendent jurisdiction, plaintiffs may be deterred from suing in
the federal courts because they can generally join federal and state claims
gressional negative respecting claims which, by themselves, were less than the requisite
jurisdictional amount.
427 U.S. at 18.
=9 Cf., e.g., Schenkier, supra note 175, at 259.
'0 While pendent jurisdiction is a plaintiffs doctrine, ancillary jurisdiction generally
denotes attempts by defendants (or non-parties) to join claims not independently within
the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court. See, e.g., Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 375-77 (1978) for apparent approval of various exercises of ancillary jurisdiction in the case of counterclaims, cross-claims, impleader and intervention
as of right.
"3,See Currie, supra note 166, at 764.
' See Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of FederalAncillary and Pendent Jurisdiction,33
U. PITT. L. REV. 759, 762-63 (1972).
As to section 1331, see supra text accompanying notes 104-05. As to the diversity
grant, see supra note 227.
23 Schenkier, supra note 168, at 253.
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in state court and thus save the cost and inconvenience of two lawsuits. 5
Of course, to say that it is consistent with congressional "purpose" to
allow the exercise of pendent jurisdiction as far as article III permits'does not necessarily establish that there was any congressional intent
to that effect, or that refusal to recognize a doctrine of pendent jurisdiction would contravene the legislative will."7 In fact, it is unlikely that
in enacting most" 8 of the jurisdictional provisions Congress gave any
thought to the concept of "pendent jurisdiction" since Court opinions
treating it extensively did not come until after these provisions were on
the statute books.? 9
c. In "approving" the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permit,
indeed encourage,' 0 joinder of claims and parties, Congress has impliedly
approved the exercise of pendent jurisdiction.24 Since such "approval"
takes the form of Congress' failure to enact a statute preventing rules
242
proposed by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act
from becoming effective, reading anything of substance into it regarding
congressional intent, particularly on an issue not directly raised before
the appropriate committees of Congress, is a hazardous enterprise at
best.243 Moreover, even if one could safely assume that when Congress
failed to veto the original rules in 1938 and amendments thereto in subsequent years, it was aware of the pendent jurisdiction cases the Court
already had decided, 4 and approved of the results in those, legislative
inaction could hardly amend the outstanding jurisdictional statutes to
encompass pendent jurisdiction.245 At best, such congressional inaction,
5 Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 259-60.
m See DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 88, distinguishing "intent," that is "the particular immediate purpose that the statute is intended to directly express and immediately accomplish"
and "purpose," that is "an ulterior purpose that the legislature intends the statute to accomplish or help to accomplish." Identification of the latter may or may not be helpful
in unlocking legislative intent. Id. at 97, 102. Moreover, he notes that "a legislative affirmation of purpose does not guarantee that it has in fact been achieved in the working
provisions of the statute." Id. at 98.
But see 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1976).
219 See Comment, Aldinger v. Howard, supra note 176, at 145-46. For example, the specific
grants of "arising under" jurisdiction were made largely prior to 1920. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 123, at 844-48. Yet, the precursor of Gibbs, Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S.
238 (1933), came later. At the same time, it must be conceded that the courts had recognized
so-called "ancillary jurisdiction" as early as 1861. See Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
450 (1861).
21 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724.
"I See Theis, Pendent Jurisdiction Over Claims Arising UnderFederalLaw, 32 HASTINGS
L.J. 91, 95, 101 n.54.
28 U.S.C. S 2072 (1976).
23 See DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 181.
24

1" E.g., Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
2
See DICKERSON, supranote 2, at 181. A variation on this argument might be that reenactment of the various jurisdictional grants following Hum without any material change constituted approval of pendent jurisdiction. There are similar problems with this, including
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if expressive of congressional approval of pendent jurisdiction, is relevant only to the creative, not the cognitive, function of statutory
interpretation.246
d. Finally, there is a more subtle argument than any of those presented
so far. Constitutionally, Congress could delegate to the Supreme Court
power to make rules influencing the scope of the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts; in fact, the Rules Enabling Act247 may
be seen as such a delegation. While rule 82 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 8 indicates that those Rules are not to be construed as directly enlarging the subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts for its
own sake, it is purely a rule of judicial self-restraint and does not abjure
all effects on jurisdiction arising from the broad provision for joinder of
claims and parties. Additionally, since the Rules displace inconsistent
federal statutes, they can, within limits, ensure that the scope of the
statutory jurisdictional grants is sufficient to encompass pendent jurisdiction where that jurisdiction would be consistent with the terms and purposes of the Rules. 49 This is not the time or place to evaluate the merits
of this argument except to say that it appears not without merit. It is
a sophisticated argument that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed,
so its ultimate viability is still in question.
None of the foregoing arguments is, however, overly convincing in
demonstrating the existence of a specific congressional intent that the
jurisdictional grants reach as far as Gibbs and Aldinger suggest they may
extend. This reinforces the point made earlier15 that, to a large degree,
fashioning the contours of the jurisdictional grants is a matter of creative
judicial interpretation, not cognition.
C. CongressionalNegation and Section 1983
Since in Aldinger Justice Rehnquist found that the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction in the circumstances presented was inconsistent with the
statutory limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts, the final aspect of the opinion to be examined is the basis on which
this conclusion was reached. His analysis can be simply stated:
a. Section 1343(3) confers on the district courts original jurisdiction "of
any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person
",251 to redress violations of various federal
rights.
the assumption that Congress took Hu-n into account in reenacting these provisions. Id.
at 182-83.
246 Cf. id. at 181.
24 28 U.S.C. S 2072 (1976).
248 FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
249 Cf.Goldberg, supra note 82, at 395.
See supra text accompanying notes 122-24.
21 28 U.S.C. S 1343(3) (1976) (emphasis added in Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 16).
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b. The civil rights action authorized by section 1983 is included within
the jurisdictional grant of section 1343(3).
c. Under Monroe v. Pape252 municipalities were exempt from substantive liability under section 1983.
d. Therefore, according to Rehnquist, there is "a great deal of force"'2to the argument that Spokane County could not be sued in federal court
where jurisdiction over the main claim against the county's officers was
based on section 1983.
e. "[Tihe reach of the statute conferring jurisdiction should be construed
in light of the scope of the cause of action as to which federal judicial
power has been extended by Congress."24
The argument thus constructed appears to be an attempt to establish
a negative intent of the first type described above, 5 that is, a specific
congressional intent to bar joinder of a certain kind of party.
But clearly the factors relevant to determination of the scope of substantive liability are not necessarily, or even ordinarily, the same as those
determinative of the appropriate forum for the adjudication of that liability. As Justice Brennan points out in Aldinger, municipalities were originally thought to be exempt from liability under section 1983 because of
concern by the Congress in 1871 regarding the constitutionality of federal
imposition of such liability on those entities."6 This rationale is quite irrelevant to the question of whether a county's vicarious liability under
state law for the acts of its officials should be litigated in the federal

courts.' 5
There are further weaknesses with Justice Rehnquist's argument in
support of finding a congressional negative. First of all, he himself ad365 U.S. 167 (1961). See also supra text accompanying note 197.
427 U.S. at 17.
Id. (emphasis omitted). See also Symm v. United States, 439 U.S. 1105 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (where Justice Rehnquist applied the "scope of the cause of action"
test to a suit brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976) [suits against states and political
subdivisions to implement U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI]).
See supra text accompanying note 214.
427 U.S. at 25.
2' See, e.g., Comment, The Impact of Aldinger v. Howard on Pendent Party Jurisdiction,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 1357,1367-71(1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Impact ofAldinger].
Of course, if Washington law was as the plaintiff alleged, Spokane County would be liable
to the same degree that it would have been had Congress intended it to fall within the
definition of "person" in section 1983. Thus, in a sense, what could not under federal law
occur directly might come about indirectly. Still, the fact that there was no federal liability
only because of constitutional doubts as to the federal government's power to impose it,
hardly supports an argument that it would necessarily be inconsistent with congressional
intent for the federal courts to impose a liability arising under state law.
Ironically, after Aldinger, the Court's decision in Monell, overruling Monroe on its broad
holding exempting municipalities from liability, found that the real concern of Congress
was not imposing liability on such entities per se but making them liable under federal
law for failure to keep the peace. 436 U.S. at 665-89. It was this same concern that was
the basis of Monell's holding that a municipality could not be liable under federal law on
a respondeat superior basis. Id. at 690-95.
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mits that had there been diversity between the plaintiff and the county
there would have been subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts
to hear the claim based on the county's vicarious liability for the federal
torts of its officers.2" It is difficult to attribute to a Congress which, he
appears to concede, may have taken such availability of diversity jurisdiction into account when considering sections 1983 and 13439 an intent
to foreclose litigation in the federal courts of the very same type of claim,
though brought there on the coattails of a federal law claim. Finally, it
is highly unlikely that the Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act of
1871 had any intent whatsoever on the issue of pendent jurisdiction since
such a doctrine did not come into vogue until long after the enactment
of the statutes involved in Aldinger."
In short, the existence of a congressional negative in the situation
presented by Aldinger is truly a work of judicial fiction, as most commentators on the case appear to admit." ' Rehnquist himself concedes that
the literal language of the statutes at issue, which forms the exclusive
basis for his conclusion, does not unambiguously require the result he
reaches.26
The transparent weakness of the Court's arguments in favor of finding
a congressional negative raises suspicions regarding what was really at
work behind the surface of Rehnquist's opinion. The lack of any real congressional intent either way on the matter, express or implied, would
seem to leave it up to the Court to exercise its law-making power within
the contours of the jurisdictional grant and to accept jurisdiction, particularly since no apparent constitutional obstacles stood in the way" and,
by the Court's own admission, considerations of judicial economy would
have been served here as in Gibbs.6' Justice Rehnquist's general analysis
of the nature of the jurisdictional grants was entirely consistent with such
a result.
The Court thus refused to exercise jurisdiction where there was no
discernable congressional intent to the contrary, and in the face of a strong
congressional policy in favor of federal court adjudication of federal
rights26 which might be substantially undermined by the refusal to permit
' 427 U.S. at 17-18 n.12.
?z9Id.
'2 See supra text accompanying notes 238-39.
" See, e.g., Schenkier, supra note 175, at 258-59; Comment, Aldinger v. Howard, supra
note 176, at 145-46.
2W 427 U.S. at 17 ("Parties . . . can argue with a great deal of force.").
A "common nucleus of operative fact" seemed clearly to unite the federal and state
claims. See supra note 109.
427 U.S. at 14-15.
See id. at 30-37 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of reaching a result in
the face of "expressed congressional intent."). Any congressional "intent" regarding the
issue of pendent jurisdiction is that inferable from the broader concept of "purpose." See
DICKERSON, supranote 2, at 101-02; WELLINGTON & ALBERT, supra note 52, at 1559 (an inference
that may or may not be reliable). See DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 102. See also supratext
accompanying note 260.
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pendent jurisdiction. 6 Perhaps then, Justice Rehnquist was implicitly
saying that before pendent party jurisdiction is available, at least where
the main claim is based on sections 1983 and 1343 and a local government
unit is joined as an additional defendant, there must be a clear expression of congressional intent to specifically authorize (or require) the court
to accept jurisdiction.267
What might be the explanation for this approach? Avoidance of the
necessity for determining issues of state law certainly may be involved.268
II See supra text accompanying notes 172-75.
IT Aldinger explicitly left open the door for pendent party jurisdiction in the case
of,
for example, tort claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C. 5 1346 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980) where federal jurisdiction is exclusive. Allegedly in such a case arguments from
convenience and economy not dispositive in Aldinger because of the existence of concurrent state jurisdiction and thus the availability to a plaintiff of at least one forum where
he could pursue all his claims at one time might carry the day. 427 U.S. at 18. Compare
Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977) (no pendent jurisdiction) with Pearce
v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 613 (D. Kan. 1978) (pendent jurisdiction sustained). At the
same time, however, it would seem that the tests relied upon to find a congressional negative
in Aldinger would be equally strong in this instance: the scope of the federally created
liability extends only to the United States, the party as to which Congress has directly
addressed itself. By thus leaving the door open in this type of case for pendent jurisdiction, an argument might be constructed that the Court is really not requiring a clear statement to permit pendent party jurisdiction in all cases, since there obviously is no such
clear statement in the case of section 1346. More importantly the inconsistency of his finding a congressional negative in section 1343 and not section 1346, arguably confirms the analysis
of the basis for the clear statement requirement which is elaborated infra in text at notes
268-88.
It is interesting to compare the refusal to exercise jurisdiction in Aldinger with Justice
Rehnquist's opinion for the Court in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Association, Inc. v.
McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981). In McNary the Court refused to approve the exercise of jurisdiction in another 1983 action, this time where the plaintiffs were trying to recover damages
from various county officials for alleged unconstitutional administration of the state tax
system. Justice Rehnquist based the result on the "principle of comity between federal
courts and state governments," a policy presumably having quasi-constitutional, statutory
and judicial origins. In Aldinger the claim at issue arguably fell within the literal terms
of section 1343. The Court, however, refused to so construe that provision, ostensibly because
of its identification of a congressional intent that the claim not be heard, but in fact based
largely on policy concerns which overcame evidence of congressional "intent." See infra
text accompanying notes 26888. In McNary, section 1343, which was the basis for subject matter jurisdiction, clearly encompassed the plaintiff's claim and the Court did not see fit to
question this. 454 U.S. at 104 n.3. Presumptively, therefore, Congress had intended that
a plaintiff with such a claim be able to litigate in the federal courts. See supra note 204.
In refusing to exercise the jurisdiction admittedly present, Justice Rehnquist did not purport to identify an implied congressional negative, as in Aldinger. Rather the policy of
comity was found to hold sway. Thus, rather than being able to justify the result in McNary
as being merely a matter of "statutory interpretation," as in Aldinger, the policy basis
for the declination of jurisdiction was entirely bared. However, the ultimate result in both
cases is arguably the same: absent a much more unequivocal statement of congressional
intent, the Court will fashion jurisdictional doctrine according to various policies, some
of quasi-constitutional, statutory or judicial origin. The comity principle involved in McNary
is arguably sufficiently well-established to justify invocation of a clear-statement requirement, see supra text accompanying notes 52-54, while some of the factors underlying the
result in Aldinger may not so conveniently fit the accepted rationales for clear statement.
See infra text accompanying notes 279-88.
' Compare supra text accompanying note 113.
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Moreover, as Judge Sobeloff noted in Kenrose Manufacturing v. Fred
Whitaker Co.,2"9 "the efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is available without
question in the state courts." 0 Since absent a grant of exclusive federal
jurisdiction, which is apparently not found in section 1343,"' a plaintiff
with both federal and state claims can find a forum in state court for
resolution of the entire controversy, a very likely result of the refusal
to permit pendent jurisdiction is to funnel cases away from the federal
and into the state courts. This is the case given the diseconomies of
litigating twice and the fact that it is the local government which will
probably have the "deep pocket."' This is certainly consistent with Justice
Rehnquist's belief in the equal competence of the state courts in vindicating federal rights... and his apparent desire to relieve the docket
congestion in the federal system, 4 both of which partially underlay his
objection to the assumption of pendent jurisdiction in the Hagans case.
,11 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972).
at 894 (quoted in Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 15).
270 Id.
1 See 427 U.S. at 36 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that Aldinger sub silentio implied that S 1983 claims are not exclusively cognizable in federal court).
' See id. at 36 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Comment, The Impact of Aldinger, supra
note 257, at 1363. See also Shapiro, supranote 12, at 294 (arguing that Rehnquist is guided
by the basic principle that questions of the exercise of federal jurisdiction should, whenever
possible, be resolved against such exercise). When Aldinger was decided, Monroe entirely
shielded municipalities from liability under section 1983. Even after Monell, where the claim
against the local government is based on vicarious liability alone, absent diversity, pendent
jurisdiction is the only rationale available for federal jurisdiction. See supra note 257.
As a non-party to a section 1983 action brought in federal court, a municipality would
presumably not be bound by findings adverse to its officers. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS S 34(3), 51 comment b (1982); but see id. S 57 comment g (1982). Moreover,
since the Supreme Court has held that state proceedings can have later preclusive effect
in § 1983 actions in federal court, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), clearly a plaintiff might very well see little purpose in bringing separate actions in state and federal
court, at least where he or she is inclined to pursue the "deep pocket" of the municipality
first. Non-parties can foreclose relitigation by former parties of issues decided adversely
to the latter. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1971). McCurry came down after Aldinger, but, as early as 1975 Justice Rehnquist arguably indicated his general disposition in favor of the result reached in McCurry.
See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 606 n.18 (1975). See also Neuborne, The Procedural Assault on the Warren Legacy: A Study in Repeal by Indirection,5 HOFSTRA L. REV.
545, 566-67 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Neuborne].
"' See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 604 ("interference with a state judicial
proceeding prevents the state not only from effectuating its substantive policies, but also
from continuing to perform the separate function of providing a forum competent to vindicate any constitutional objections interposed against those policies."). See also, Hagans
v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("state courts [are] likewise charged
with enforcing the United States Constitution."); id. at 559.
I" See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 552 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (noting that "the
lower federal courts have been confronted by a massive influx of cases challenging state
welfare regulations."). See also Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (O'Connor
& Rehnquist, JJ., concurring); 14 The Third Branch No. 10, at 2 (Oct. 1982). See generally
Comment, Federalism,Section 1983 and State Law Remedies: Curtailing the Federal Civil
Rights Docket by Restricting the Underlying Right, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 1035 (1982) (discussing, inter alia, other techniques invoked by the Burger Court to reduce the S 1983 case
load); compare supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
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This latter concern also motivates his current approach to implied rights
of action.. and federal common law,"" though in the case of section 1983
actions, unlike either of those instances, Congress has in section 1343
established a docket priority for civil rights actions." Furthermore, even
if a plaintiff is not deterred from suing on his federal claim in federal
court, the litigation may be more quickly disposed of than if state law
claims also have to be tried. Thus, the docket priorities established by
the other specific grants of jurisdiction will not be undermined.2"8
Delving a bit deeper, however, it should be noted that the assumption
that state and federal courts are functionally interchangeable forums likely
to provide equivalent protection for federal rights has been questioned. 9
Among other things, state judges are allegedly more susceptible to
majoritarian pressures, if only because of their method of selection and
tenure,"0 and, thus, may be more disposed to uphold collective societal
judgments presumably represented in the behavior of state and local
officials, elected and unelected.28' It is such judgments that Justice Rehnquist, along with others on the Burger Court, are purportedly so loath
to intrude upon,2" a theme which will also become evident in the later
discussion regarding implied rights of action and federal common law.2
Funnelling section 1983 actions into state courts may decrease the
likelihood of their success given the nature of the state tribunals and,
thus, majoritarian decision-making may be indirectly protected.' In a 1974
article, Justice Rehnquist himself observed that "there has been an
apparent and obvious shift of authority to the federal courts, at the
expense of state courts in particular and state and local governments in
2
general.""
' Aldinger is part of his effort to restore what he sees as the
"appropriate" balance in this area.
In addition, it has recently been suggested that at the base of his judicial
1,See infra text accompanying notes 373-75.
2,1 See infra text accompanying notes 554-60.
See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
Cf.Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. at 559. ("But Congress left to state courts not only
those claims involving state law but also those claims involving federal law which it felt
did not merit the time of federal courts."). The same concerns might suggest a similarly
hostile approach to pendent claim jurisdiction, though Rehnquist purports to distinguish
that from pendent party cases. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.
See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
Id. at 1127.
' Liability under § 1983 requires proof of action "under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage."
m See Rydell, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and JudicialSelf-Restraint, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 875,
911, 914 (1975).
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 392-99, 529, 544-45 & 550.
See Neuborne, supra note 279, at 1131 ("the Court's increasing preference for state
court adjudication and its distrust of federal jurisdiction are explicable as the logical forum
allocation corollaries to its major substantive premise [i.e. deference to majoritarian decisionmaking]").
"I Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A. J. 787 (1974).
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philosophy is a clear priority given state autonomy and the protection
'
of property rights rather that other types of "liberty" and "equality."286
Thus, the result in Aldinger may in part be attributable to Justice Rehnquist's hostility on the merits (or indifference) to the types of constitutional claims asserted by the plaintiff in Aldinger287 and his feeling that
the state courts would be much less sympathetic to those claims. 88
The concern with docket congestion is a traditional. 9 basis for refusing
to exercise jurisdiction in the absence of an express congressional demand
to the contrary. It is party-neutral and consistent with the purpose of
the jurisdictional grants in the sense that it helps to maintain a high
quality of decision-making in the cases that are heard. Use of clearstatement methodology for the other purposes suggested above is not
justified by any of the defensible rationales for that approach.' Regardless
of the breadth of the de facto delegations made by Congress to the courts
in the jurisdictional statutes, the national legislature clearly did not intend that they be manipulated for such purposes.
IV.

IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION

The question of the existence of a statutory cause of action is, of course,
one of statutory construction.
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington
A. From Common Law to Statutory Interpretation
In its approach to recognition of the right of private parties to sue for
violation of federal statutes which do not expressly provide for a remedy
on their behalf, the Supreme Court has moved from the liberal stance
of J.L Case Co. v. Borak,292 to the four factor test of Cort v. Ash,293 and
See Fiss at 20-21.
See supratext accompanying notes 193-94. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (plurality opinion by Rehnquist, J.) (dealing with
procedural requirements applicable to discharge of government employee).
2
Cf.Neuborne, supra note 279, at 1106-07; Note, Intent, supra note 16, at 910-12 (suggesting that clear statement trend is one means to realize laizzez-faire individualism).
See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-61.
2" 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)(opinion for the Court by Rehnquist, J.).
377 U.S. 426 (1964)(recognizing implied cause of action for damages in favor of
shareholders for losses resulting from deceptive proxy solicitations in violation of S 14(a)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
422 U.S. 66 (1975) (no private cause of action for damages may be inferred from Federal
Elections Campaign Act), where the Court laid down the test that allegedly still prevails:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted," . . . -that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor
of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintiff? ...And finally, is the cause of action one
2
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then to increasing emphasis in Cannon v. University of Chicago' and subsequent cases on the existence of "congressional intent" as the sine qua
non for the "implication" of a private remedy.295 The story of the evolution in doctrine in this area has been well told elsewhere 296 and need not
be repeated here. However, it is important to note for present purposes
that Justice Rehnquist has been one of the moving forces in this change.
In Cannon, which recognized the existence of a private right to sue
for alleged sex discrimination in admission to a medical school receiving
federal financial assistance, Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result.
But, his concurrence made a special point of noting that the Court had
changed course since Borak where it had apparently exercised what it
believed was an inherent judicial power to create common law remedies
for statutory violations. 297 As in the case of congressional displacement
of federal common law,"9 he emphasized that federal courts are more constrained in fashioning judge-made rules than are state courts of general
jurisdiction. 299 Therefore, the implication of private rights of action must
be "basically one of statutory construction.""'
Yet, during the period the Court adhered to the approach epitomized
by Borak, it was not entirely mistaken to regard the implication of private
rights of action as a matter of statutory interpretation in dealing with
regulatory schemes since that approach formed part of the legal
framework in which Congress operated in enacting those programs.
Arguably, it constituted part of the context which Congress took into
account and relied upon in fashioning laws,39 ' a context which, as noted
traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the

States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely
on federal law?
Id. at 78 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).

" 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (inferring a private cause of action from § 901(a) of title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972).
Id. at 688.
'
See, e.g., Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 VA. L. REV. 553 (1981); Hazen, Implied
PrivateRemedies Under Federal Statutes:Neither a Death Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil
Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333 (1980); Pillai, supranote
137; Comment, Implied PritteRights of Action UnderFederal Statutes: CongressionalIntent, JudicialDeference, or Mutual Abdication?, 50 FORD. L. REV. 611 (1982); Comment, An
Analytical Framework For Implied Causes of Action: Section 17 of the Securities Exchange
Act and Redington v. Touche Ross & Co., 59 B.U.L. REV. 157 (1979).
' See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
402 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring in the judgment). See also Frankel, supra note 296,

at 557-58.
See infra text accompanying notes 472-75.
441 U.S. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 ("There is no federal general common law.").
" 441 U.S. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
" See DICKERSON supranote 2, at 226. ("This is the presumption that the legislature has
taken account of the rest of the legal order and has tried to integrate the statute with
it, both fairly and rationally.") Of course such a presumption must be open to rebuttal
in each case. In fact, a strong argument could be made in favor of the opposite presumption at least when it comes to decided cases, given their number and the inability of the
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before," 2 courts may consider in performing their cognitive function of
discovering meaning. Justice Rehnquist himself was willing to concede
as much in Cannon."m In fact, this was the justification for his concurrence in Cannon's result. Accordingly, given the Borak approach there
was a sense in which there was an identifiable congressional intent to
authorize private rights of action. But, for reasons to be examined below,'
this judicial approach to the existence of rights of action was not sufficient for the Justice who in Cannon apprised Congress that "the ball,
so to speak, may well now be in its court.13 5 It is not sufficient for Congress to rely on the courts to decide whether there should be private
rights of action.2" The legislature itself must directly confront the issue
and, if it chooses, clearly provide for private rights to sue for violation
of statutory duties.0 7
Having been thus informed, the legislature will presumably take this
changed legal climate into account and its failure to expressly mention
a private right of action in statutes subsequently enacted will reflect a
conscious decision that it not exist. But, even if Congress does not pay
heed and nevertheless intends that private remedies exist, the Court will
not feel bound by that intent unless it is expressed with unmistakeable
clarity. While not expressed in exactly those terms in Rehnquist's Cannon
opinion, wQ shall see that this is the upshot of his remarks there and
in subsequent opinions.
B. A Rehnquist Opinion on Implied Rights of Action
While he has authored other opinions for the Court in the implied right
area,0 8 Rehnquist's most elaborate treatment of a contention that such
a remedy exists under a statute came in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington.
In that case, a broker-dealer, registered with the Securities and Exhange
Commission, retained the services of a certified public accountant firm
to conduct audits of its books and prepare for filing with the Commission
specialist committees of Congress to keep track of them. Perhaps the mention of the relevant case(s) in the committee reports accompanying a bill should be required to, at minimum,
rebut a presumption of congressional ignorance of the caselaw.
302 See supra text accompanying notes 27-36.
441 U.S. at 718 ("Cases such as J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, supra, and numerous cases
from other federal courts, gave Congress good reason to think that the federal judiciary
would undertake this task.").

39'
See infra text accompanying notes 401-24.
'0' 441 U.S. at 718.
306 Id.
307 Id.
" See, e.g., Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136
(1980) (refusing to imply private cause of action under the Federal Records Act); Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (rejecting contention that Trade Secrets Act affords
a private right of action).
442 U.S. 560 (1979).
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the annual reports of financial condition required by section 17(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.10 The brokerage firm later became
insolvent and left insufficient property to make whole those customers
who had left assets or deposits with it. The accounting firm was allegedly
guilty of improper audit and certification of the financial statements and
other records. This allegedly prevented revelation of the true financial
condition of the brokerage concern until it was too late to take remedial
action to forestall liquidation or to lessen the adverse financial consequences of liquidation to the customers. While the federal statute invoked
as the basis for the action did not expressly provide the customers with
a right to sue in these circumstances, the plaintiffs relied on an implied
right theory to recover damages from the accountants. Finding that there
was no congressional "intent" to create such a right of action, the Supreme
Court upheld the district court's dismissal of the complaint.
Viewing the issue of implied rights as a conventional problem of
statutory construction and divination of congressional intent,"' the Court,
not surprisingly, began its analysis with the language of the statute
itself." 2 That language allegedly gave no hint of an intent to create a
private cause for violations of the nature relied upon by the plaintiffs. 1 '
Rather, the evident intent of section 17 was merely to require the keeping
of certain records so that the Securities and Exchange Commission could
perform its regulatory functions.1 4 Justice Rehnquist then shifted his attention to the legislative history which was equally silent regarding the
issue presented. 5 His analysis purported to show, at the least, the lack
of any express congressional consideration regarding the existence of a
private cause of action. Finally, flanking section 17 and enacted contemporaneously with it were two provisions expressly creating private
damage remedies for other types of violations of the 1934 Act 1 Other
sections in the same act also explicitly created private rights of action
for their violation 17 "Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide
a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly." 8 '
Indeed, further inquiry suggested not merely the failure of Congress
3,0 15 U.S.C. S 78q(a) (1970).
311442 U.S. at 568.
312See Luneburg, Book Review,

57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212,213 (1982) (reviewing 0. HETZEL,
LEGISLATIVE LAW AND PROCESS CASES AND MATERIALS (1980)). It is becoming almost automatic
these days for the Court to begin its analysis of statutory issues with such statements
as "[t]he search for Congressional intent begins with the language of the statute." Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 97 (1981).
313 442 U.S. at 568-69.

3, Id- at 569-70.
3,1 Id.
at 571.
Ol Act of June 6, 1934, % 16, 18, 48 Stat. 896, 897, codified at 15 U.S.C. S 78p(b) (1970)
(use of inside information); id. S 78r(a) (false statements in required reports).
317 Act of June 6, 1934, % 9, 20, 48 Stat. 889, 899, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1970)
(manipulation of securities prices); 78t (liability of controlling persons).
442 U.S. at 572.
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to address this issue, but a congressional intent that a private right to
sue in the circumstances presented in Touche Ross not be permitted.
Section 1811 was particularly significant in this regard. It explicitly created
a private damage remedy for those persons who purchased or sold
securities in reliance on misrepresentations in reports filed with the Commission. However, the cause of action relied upon in the case at bar did
not involve any purchaser or seller of a security, but otherwise was similar
to the action authorized by section 18. The hoary maxim, "expressio unius
est exclusio alterius"" was, thus, presumptively relevant in this context.32
Since the language, structure and legislative history of the 1934 Act
did not provide evidence of a specific intent to create a private cause
of action for violations of section 17, the argument was unavailing that
implication of a private remedy for the parties in Touche Ross would
advance the purposes of that provision. Legislative purpose might, in conjunction with other factors, shed light on congressional intentsu but,
reliance on it alone to create a right of action partook more of judicial
than of legislative law-making.23 "The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether the Court thinks that it can improve
3
upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.
To protestations that failure to imply a right of action would sanction
"injustice," Justice Rehnquist's response was that it was not its province
to "legislate.1 32 Moreover, if the Court was mistaken in discerning past

or current congressional intention regarding the problem at issue,
Congress could remedy the hiatus thus created by clearly stating its intent
in a manner which the Court could recognize, that is by amendment to
the statutory vehicle or at least in the accompanying legislative history. 326
If it is accepted that the existence of a private right of action should
depend on discovery of the actual existence of an affirmative congressional
intent to create it, both the analytical method and result reached by Rehn3 Certainly,
quist in Touche Ross are defensible as far as they go.2
the
15 U.S.C. S 78r(a) (1970).
"The expression of one implies the exclusion of another." It has been noted that
sometimes the maxim accurately reflects intended meaning and sometimes it does not,
depending on context. DICKERSON. supra note 2, at 47.
11 See 442 U.S. at 574, expressly relying on, inter alia, National R.R. Passenger Corp.
v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974) which directly cites this maxim.
The Court in Touche Ross, however, said that it need not decide whether Congress expressly intended § 18(a) as the exclusive remedy for misstatements in S 17(a) reports. 442
U.S. at 574.
442 U.S. at 276.
See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 740 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
324 442 U.S. at 578.
Id. at 579.
Id. See also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 40 n.5 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ('IT]he
statutes at issue in those cases did not expressly provide for such a remedy and there
was no clear evidence of such a congressional intention in their legislative history.") (emphasis added).
Cf. Greene, JudicialImplicationof Remedies for FederalStatutory Violations: The Separation of Powers Concerns, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 469, 499 n.167 (1980).
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sources relied upon are the traditionally accepted ones of statutory
construction." The "expressio unius" maxim is probably more often
invoked to justify a conclusion reached by other means since its accuracy
in establishing an intent to foreclose certain actions depends on context."n
Nevertheless, the fact that various sections of the Securities Exchange
Act do explicitly provide for private remedies at the least suggests that
Congress did not specifically address the question of the right of private
parties to sue for violations of section 17. That the implication of a private
remedy might be consistent with or helpful, or even necessary, to the
achievement of the purposes of the Act does not necessarily indicate that
at the time the statute was enacted Congress formed an intent that the
courts grant the remedy.o It might in some contexts be suggestive of
the existence of such an intent, but alone it is hardly dispositive. If the
relevant materials for cognition are limited to those relied upon by Justice
Rehnquist, the Court in Touche Ross may have been incorrect in divining
the relevant congressional intent, but, as a matter of cognitive statutory
construction the result was supportable."'
The analysis arguably breaks down, however, to the extent it ignores
part of the context in which the Congress responsible for the statute
operated. While Borak was not decided until thirty years after the
Securities Exchange Act was enacted, it might be contended that by 1934
there had been established a tradition of the judiciary utilizing statutory
sources to create private rights of action 2 which Congress could rely
upon to fill any gaps in the regulatory schemes enacted by it.' As

However, the use of legislative history by the courts has been challenged. See, e.g.,
DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 137-97.
1 Id. at 47.
3 Cf. DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 88 (legislative purposes in the sense of "ulterior purposes" are broad enough that they can be only partly served by such compliance); id. 98-100
("A statement of legislative purpose cannot be read as decreeing whatever is necessary
to achieve it beyond what can be sustained by the specific working provisions of the statute
when read in the context of the legislative purpose."). See also 447 U.S. at 578.
-11Since the record keeping requirement was intended at least in part "for the protection of investors," see 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970), the customers allegedly injured were
presumably intended beneficiaries of the scheme. See 442 U.S. at 580-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This did not affect Justice Rehnquist's analysis which emphasized that "[Section] 17(a)
neither confers rights on private parties nor proscribes any conduct as unlawful." Id. at
569. Section 17(a) did not in terms purport to impose any duties on accountan~ts, let alone
forbid misstatements in the required reports. It would seem, therefore, that the Court could
have disposed of the case by accepting arguendo that section 17 created rights of action
in customers in some instances but not in the case at bar where the provision invoked
did not purport to condemn the defendant's conduct as unlawful.
See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Ific. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374-77
(1982) (Stevens, J., citing cases); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 22-26 (1981) (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part, dissenting in part); California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 298-301 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
But cf. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 731-35 (Powell, J., dissenting).
California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., concurring). Of course, it
may be questionable in a particular instance whether Congress has in fact acted with
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indicated previously,' Justice Rehnquist does not believe that Congress
should be allowed intentionally or unintentionally to avoid directly confronting the issue of private rights to sue by such reliance. The reasons
for his narrowing of the "proper context" for statutory interpretation in
this area will be explored later.15
Justice Rehnquist clearly accepted that Congress can convey its intent
implicitly as well as expressly.- 6 The materials for ascertaining an intent,
however communicated, are the same as are the limitations which he would
impose on the relevant context as an aid in discovering meaning. However,
with respect to the question of the right of private parties to sue for
violation of statutory directives, inquiry into these sources will usually 3
lead to a result similar to Touche Ross absent express language creating
a private cause of action. This will be the case in view of the demonstrated
ability of Congress to explicitly provide for private remedies when its
attention has been specifically directed to the matter.3
In his dissent in Cannon, Justice Powell argued that "[h]enceforth, we
should not condone the implication of any private action from a federal
statute absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended
such an action to exist." 9 While the opinion in Touche Ross did not explicitly invoke this observation in support of the result reached, Justice
Rehnquist has recently indicated his concurrence with this strict
standard. 4
C. Cases since Touche Ross
Over the last several years, arguments in favor of implied rights of
action have generally been unsuccessful in the Supreme Court. The 1980-81
Term was particularly significant, both in terms of the number of opinions
on this issue and the total lack of success of the contentions raised."'
awareness of and reliance upon a part or parts of the relevant legal environment. The
Rehnquist approach, however, is willing, arguendo, to assume such awareness and reliance.
See supra text accompanying note 303.
' See supra text accompanying notes 304-07.
' See infra text accompanying notes 401-24.
I See 442 U.S. at 575 ("The central inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create,
either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action."). See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
' But see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1979) (finding implied right to sue to rescind a contract made in violation of Investment Advisors
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. SS 80b-1 to 206-21 (1976), because statute declared such contracts
void and, in order to give meaning to such a provision, implication of a private remedy
seemed necessary).
' Cf.Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at
25-26 (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting).
o See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 409 (Powell,
J., dissenting in an opinion joined by Burger, Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ.).
31 See Middlesex City Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)
(Federal Water Pollution Control Act and Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries
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However, close reading of the opinions discloses an important division
on the Court regarding the appropriate approach to take. Touche Ross
proved to be a relatively easy case for almost all the Justices342 so the
divergence in viewpoint did not surface there. The basic disagreement
appears to be between those who adhere to the clear-statement approach
of Justices Rehnquist and Powell and those who are favorably disposed
toward the apparently more liberal stance of Justice Stevens. He continues
to adhere to the formula first propounded in Cort v. Ash 43 and seems
willing to leave some room for judicial creativity in the remedial area.
Justice Rehnquist has made it clear that he thinks (or hopes) that Cort
no longer represents
the law in view of Touche Ross and other recent
decisions." 4
This basic split surfaced again in the recently decided case of Merrill
345
Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith v. Curran,
which recognized an implied
6
right of action for damages under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).3
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun joined. Justice Powell filed a
vigorous dissent with which Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and Chief
Justice Burger expressed their agreement. In the beginning of his opinion,
Justice Stevens reiterated a point he has stressed in other implied right
cases: 7 historically, the federal courts had acted, to an extent, in the
tradition of common law courts in fashioning remedies for federal statutory
violations. 8 While Stevens conceded that this more freewheeling approach
Act); Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 US. 630 (1981) (Sherman and Clayton
Acts); California v. Sierra club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981) (Equal Pay Act
of 1963 and title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964); Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu,
450 U.S. 754 (1981) (Davis-Bacon Act).
2 Only Justice Marshall dissented. See 442 U.S. 580-83. The reasons it may have been
so easy for some who do not share Justice Rehnquist's strict approach are discussed in
supra note 331.
1 422 U.S. at 78, quoted in supra note 293. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287,
298-301 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens wrote the opinion in Cannon (recognizing an implied right) from which Justice Powell so vehemently dissented given what he
believed was the potential for judicial law making inherent in the Cort test. 441 U.S. at
731, 74041. See supratext accompanying notes 132-53. Stevens also joined in Justice White's
dissent in Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. at 25-36, which dissent adhered
to the Cort analysis and appeared to give the courts more leeway in affording remedies.
Id. at 30. Justice Stevens did, however, write the opinion for the Court in Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77 (1981) which refused to recognize
a private right of action for contribution under the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or, alternately, to create a federal common law right of
contribution in the circumstances.
' California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 301-02 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
34

456 U.S. 353 (1982).

u 7 U.S.C. SS 1-50 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
'7 See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298, 299-300, (Stevens, J., concurring); Middlesex City Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 22-26 (Stevens,
J., concurring).
11 456 U.S. at 375-77.
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had been discarded in Cort,49 the contrasting approaches of the majority
and dissenters in Curranare basically explained by a greater willingness
on the part of the former to give some breathing room to judicial
creativity.
For Justice Stevens a crucial distinction between the post-Cort cases,
where the Court had refused to recognize an implied right of action, and
the present controversy arose from the recognition by several federal
courts35 of an implied right of action under the CEA prior to the 1974
amendments to that statute. The nature of the required inquiry was,
therefore, not the traditional Cort test, but rather, "whether Congress
intended to preserve the preexisting remedy." '' On the assumption that
Congress legislated with an awareness of the existing legal context,"3
an affirmative answer was required since the 1974 amendments constituted
a "comprehensive reexamination and significant amendment of the CEA
[leaving] intact the statutory provisions under which the federal courts
had implied a cause of action."3 Presumably, had Congress not wanted
to preserve the formerly recognized cause of action it would have spoken
explicitly on that point. Moreover, Justice Stevens relied on various
aspects of the 1974 amendments to the CEA and on their legislative
history to provide what he suggested was additional evidence of the
requisite intent. 54 While the 1974 amendments added a provision for
administrative award of reparations, 55 which could apparently have been
invoked for at least some of the violations alleged in the case at bar,'
this did not suggest to the majority any intent to extinguish the previously
recognized remedy enforceable by the courts. 5 '
The dissenters found the majority's approach to be inconsistent with
separation of powers principles'-' and reiterated that the crucial intent
was the intent to create formed by the Congresses that originally enacted
and subsequently amended the CEA. 59 The lower court opinions relied
on by the majority were "erroneous" since they were not based on a search
for such intent.6 In 1974, Congress did not amend or even reenact most
of the provisions at issue36' and, thus, could not bind the Supreme Court
Id. at 377-78.
See, e.g., Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
35 456 U.S. at 379.
Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 301-02.
Id. at 1841.
Id. at 1841-44.
See 7 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
456 U.S. at 384.
Id. at 384-86.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 396-98.
Id. at 398-401. These decisions were handed down prior to Cort which was decided
in 1975. They were thus "wrong" only in the sense that, in retrospect, they were out of
line with the Court's subsequent change of position regarding the appropriate type of inquiry in implied right cases.
"1 456 U.S. at 402-03 & n.11.
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to this incorrectly reached result even if that silence could be construed
362
as approval.
It is elemental that Congress "cannot legislate effectively by not
legislating at all."3" Therefore, for the dissenters who viewed the intent
to create a private remedy as absolutely essential in all circumstances,
congressional intent can be effective, relevant, and binding on the courts
only if expressed in the constitutionally required manner, that is, by means
of the written statutory vehicle when viewed in proper context, which
apparently includes legislative history made contemporaneously with the
enactment.
On the other hand, Justice Stevens' opinion in Curranneed not be read
as disregarding the principle that Congress can formally legislate only
by statute. Rather, he was saying that congressional inaction in 1974, in
the face of the judicial opinions recognizing an implied right, was only
"evidence" of congressional feeling on the issue, confirmed by other aspects
of the 1974 legislative history.'6 While not binding in a legal sense, the
available legislative materials supported the Court's decision not to disturb
the previously recognized cause of action. In fact, it was not so much
that the materials convincingly showed an affirmative intent to preserve,
a matter the dissent made much of,36 rather, they at best showed that,
in 1974, Congress did not form a specific intent to disturb the prior line
of cases. 66 The approach of the majority left the implied remedy without
the statutory support deemed absolutely essential by the dissent, but,
rested more on the courts' common law powers which had been invoked
by the lower courts in originally recognizing the private cause of action
prior to 1974.367 This did not escape Justice Powell, as indicated by his
remark that "[ft]oday's decision is also disquieting because of its implicit
'
view of the judicial role in the creation of common law."368
The Stevens opinion thus evidences the view that the federal courts
and Congress are "collaborative instrumentalities of justice" 9 and that
implication of remedies can advance the legislative will in an ultimate
3 70
sense by furthering the underlying purposes of the statutory scheme.
Id. at 402-03.
DICKERSON, supra note 2, at 181. The potential dangers of reading anything, in terms
of legislative intent, into "silence" have been noted. Id. at 181-83.
456 U.S. at 381-82.

Id. at 404-06.
Id. at 407-08 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 398-401 (Powell, J., dissenting).

Id. at 408.
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm., 444 F.2d 841,
851-52 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (citing United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S.
409, 422 (1941) (dealing with court-agency relationships)). In Bush v. Lucas, 103 S.Ct. 2404
(1983) Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court again emphasized his more liberal view regarding the remedial powers of the federal courts, id.2409, 2411, though the Court there decided not to authorize a new non-statutory damage remedy for federal employees where first
amendment rights are violated by their superiors.

"1456 U.S. at 393-94. See also Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw": Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and States Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV.
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On that basis, implication is desirable. The majority opinion in Curran
bears a striking resemblance to the Blackmun-Stevens-Marshall dissent
in City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,' where a year prior to Curran,the Court,
in an opinion authored by Justice Rehnquist, significantly cut back on
the federal courts' common law powers. We will turn to analysis of that
development, but not before examination of the factors which appear to
have prompted Justice Rehnquist's strict approach to the implied rights
area.
D. Rationale for Clear Statement Approach to Rights of Action
Unlike Justice Powell, who in Cannon elaborately described the reasons
for his adherence to a clear statement requirement in the context of
implied right cases, 2 Justice Rehnquist has not always been explicit in
making his concerns known in the opinions dealing with rights of action
based on statute which he has authored. Nevertheless, there are reliable
sources for inferring what those concerns must be.
Docket congestion in the federal system is clearly perceived as a significant problem. Not only has Rehnquist adverted directly to this in different,
albeit related contexts, 73 but other members of the Court have viewed
such a concern as one of the motivating factors behind the shift from
the Borak approach. 74 As noted previously, an increased caseload impacts
on the quality of federal justice in all cases that are heard.375 In addition,
implication of private remedies without congressional authorization
797, 799-800 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw']; Note,
Intent, supra note 16, at 906 ("[T]o deny judicial competence and authority to implement
legislative purpose is to 'deny . . .essential legislative authority.'").
"' 451 U.S. 304 (1981). See, in particular, id. at 334 n.2 ("On the other hand, where federal
interests alone are at stake, participation by the federal courts is often desirable, and indeed necessary, if federal policies developed by Congress are to be fully effectuated ....
The whole concept of interstitial federal lawmaking suggests a cooperative interaction between courts and Congress ...").
In the area of remedies for constitutional violations by federal officials, the Court follows
an approach similar to that evidenced in Curran(remedy available unless Congress negates),
see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), an approach with which Rehnquist disagrees. Id.
at 53. Compare, however, Rehnquist's approach to pendent jurisdiction (it exists absent
congressional negative). See supra text accompanying notes 211-18.
"'
441 U.S. at 730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting).
, See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516-17 (1982) (O'Connor & Rehnquist,
JJ., concurring in opinion finding that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not
a prerequisite to a § 1983 suit): "At the very least, prior state administrative proceedings
would resolve many claims, thereby decreasing the number of S 1983 actions filed in the
federal courts, which are now straining under excessive caseloads." See also Foremost Ins.
Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 677 (1982) (Rehnquist and O'Connor joining in dissent written by Justice Powell).
"' See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377
(opinion by Stevens, J.).
, See supratext accompanying note 116. See also 14 The Third Branch No. 10, at 2 (Oct.,
1982) (noting Justice Rehnquist's concern over the impact of docket congestion on the quality
of Federal justice).
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threatens to override the docket priorities which Congress has established
through those specific grants of subject matter jurisdiction to the district
courts which have been enacted as counterparts to legislatively created
causes of action."8 If a right of action is largely the creation of the
judiciary, arguably, it would be disingenuous to base subject matter
jurisdiction on any specific grant of jurisdiction contained in the substantive statute which is allegedly violated; presumably the intended scope
of any such grant matches those rights expressly or impliedly created
by Congress elsewhere in the enactment. 7 Therefore, if the right of action
is court-created, the plaintiff must in most cases depend on the grant
of general federal question jurisdiction in section 13318 7or perhaps a
somewhat less encompassing grant such as section 1337.1 1
In Carlsonv. Green,' the Court recognized a cause of action for damages
based on allegations that federal prison officials had failed to provide
medical attention to plaintiff's son in violation of the eighth amendment."'
Justice Rehnquist filed a vigorous dissent, ' arguing that "it is 'an exercise
of power that the Constitution does not give us' for this Court to infer
a private civil damages remedy from the Eighth Amendment or any other
constitutional provision." m During the course of his argument the Justice
also noted:
It is clear under Art. III of the Constitution that Congress has broad
authority to establish priorities for the allocation of judicial resources
in defining the jurisdiction of federal courts ....Congress thus may
prevent the federal courts from deciding cases that it believes would
be an unwarranted expenditure of judicial time or would impair the
See sup'a text accompanying notes 117-18.
This is presumably one reason why Justice Rehnquist in Touche Ross refused to infer
congressional intent to create a private right of action from the jurisdictional provisions
of the Securities Act of 1934. See 442 U.S. at 577.
The statement in the text, of course, assumes that Congress, in enacting a statute, does
not expressly rely on the courts to fill the remedial gap. If it does so rely, perhaps any
jurisdictional provisions enacted as part of the regulatory scheme, and not section 1331,
were intended to encompass the judicially created remedy.
In Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), jurisdiction of
implied actions for rescission of contracts made void by § 215 of the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940 could allegedly be based on 15 U.S.C. S 80 b-14 (1976). 444 U.S. at 19 n.9. But
in that case, the Court found the requisite intent to create a private right of action for
this type of remedy.
Arguably, absent such intent, if a court purported to rely on one of these specific subject matter grants, for example § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (1976), in hearing a case based on a cause of action of its own creation, it would
be "expanding" its jurisdiction in the sense referred to by Justice Powell in Cannon, 441
U.S. at 74647. See also supra text accompanying notes 131-53.
38 Cf.441 U.S. at 746 n.17 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also supra text accompanying notes
117-19.
m 28 U.S.C. 5 1337 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See supra text accompanying note 118.
=* 446 U.S. 14 (1980)(§ 1331 was the asserted subject matter jurisdiction base here.).
"5 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII (cruel and unusual punishment).
446 U.S. at 31-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id at 34 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 428 (1971).
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ability of federal courts to dispose of matters that Congress considers
to be more important ....
While it is analytically correct to view the question of jurisdiction
as distinct from that of the appropriate relief to be granted ... congressional authority here may all too easily be undermined when the
judiciary, under the guise of exercising its authority to fashion
appropriate remedies, creates expansive damage remedies that have
not been authorized by Congress."'

Clearly the same argument could be made against the practice of
implying private rights of action for statutory violations where there has
been no congressional authorization for those suits.
Unlike Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist does not argue that judicial
implication of rights of action unlawfully "expands" the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts. 3 5 In fact, he specifically separates the
questions of jurisdiction and available remedy and later in the opinion
makes it clear that Bivens-typel cases, like Carlson,should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, not for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.3 The "expansion" that is his principal
concern is the enlargement of the types and numbers of cases that the
courts will have to deal with, which in turn may undermine congressional
judgments regarding what types of cases should be the primary objects
of the courts' concern. 88 The theme struck here is echoed in Rehnquist's
earlier dissent in Hagans v. Lavine.389
Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Carlson suggests additional concerns that
likely motivate his adherence to the requirement of clear statement in
the case of implied rights based on federal statutes. In fashioning an appropriate sanction for disfavored conduct, obviously a variety of factors may
be taken into account, including not only the types of damages suffered
by victims injured by the conduct and the likely effect of the sanction
in deterring future misconduct by the wrongdoer and others, but also
the potential social costs of too generous a measure of compensation and
the risks of over-deterrence. The legislative branch may in some instances,
' Id. at 36-37 (citations omitted).
. See supra text accompanying notes 132-46.
' Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
(implied remedy for violation of fourth Amendment rights).
446 U.S. at 42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See also id. at 39.
415 U.S. at 559 ("But Congress left to state courts not only those claims involving
state law but also those claims involving federal law which it felt did not merit the time
of federal courts.") While he disagrees with judicial implication of damage remedies for
constitutional violations, Justice Rehnquist concedes that the federal courts have long fashioned equitable relief in such circumstances without express congressional authorization,
a tradition which he does not expressly question. 446 U.S. at 42-44. The logic of such a
distinction is hard to fathom in terms of the impact of actions on docket priorities, though
it does make some sense in terms of his other concerns regarding judicial implication of
remedies. See infra note 392.
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though perhaps not in all,3" have resources for factual investigation not
available to the courts which may contribute to more informed decisionmaking in this area. In addition, the legislature has a somewhat greater
range of remedial options open to it than do the courts. 91
Beyond pure questions of fact, there are important policy issues at stake
in fashioning sanctions, such as whether vindication of the social interest
of providing full compensation to the victim for his losses overbalances
the social costs that are likely to ensue from a measure of damages so
calculated 92 Congress, and not the federal judiciary, is the electorily
responsible branch vested by article I of the Constitution 93 with the
principal substantive policy-making power of the national government. 94
Constitutionally, Congress is clearly the preeminent maker of public policy
within the sphere of federal competence and the initial law-making power
is largely in its hands, not the courts' 95
It is to these matters of institutional superiority and constitutional
preference to which Rehnquist both expressly and implicitly refers in
?39
0
Cannon
and Carlson.9 ' To the extent that these concerns bulk large
in the area of court-created actions for violations of constitutional rights
where no statutory scheme is implicated,399 they are magnified when
judicially-wrought remedies are engrafted onto specific statutory
frameworks. For in such instances, the courts' handiwork may substantially undermine or otherwise distort carefully crafted balances, perhaps
in the process, undoing the underlying political .compromises, on the basis
of either mistaken assumptions or policy preferences not shared by the
legislature. 99 Legislative, and therefore popular, supremacy is thereby
See Wellington, supra note 52, at 240.
Provision of civil penalties is one example.
3 446 U.S. at 47. Reliance on injunctive relief alone may avoid some of the problems
created by damage remedies, however.
U.S. CONST. art. I.
" Id.
cl. 8.
3 This is confirmed by the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1652 (1976), which reflects,
inter alla, the constitutional allocation of policy-making power between the national legislature
and the federal courts. See Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie-The Thread, 87
HARv. L. REv. 1682 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Mishkin, Some FurtherLast Words on Erie].
See also infra text accompanying notes 432-44. The considerations involved in fashioning
remedies, particularly damage remedies, mark them as clearly "substantive" within the
meaning of the Rules of Decision Act. Cf., e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society, 421 U.S. 240, 259 n.31 (1975) (attorney's fees). Without express or implied support
for them in the Constitution or federal statute, the Act limits federal judicial creativity,
presumptively at least.
441 U.S. at 717-18 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
z 446 U.S. at 31-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In Carlson,though, a key issue was the compatibility of the Federal Tort Claims Act
with a judicially created remedy.
1 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 45 and n.10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("... or that
Congress did not consider the marginal increase in deterrence here to be outweighed by
other considerations."). See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
2
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threatened, though perhaps with the best of intentions.
But for Rehnquist, the constitutional role of Congress as the preeminent
policy-maker implies something at least as important as the need to protect
its prerogatives from misbegotten judicial meddling." The Constitution
vests the substantive powers of the federal government in the national
legislature, elected by and therefore subject to majoritarian pressures,
and this implies that there are some responsibilities that Congress itself
cannot shirk, and from which the courts should not save the elected
representatives."' This was suggested by Rehnquist's concurrence in
Cannon where he noted that "Congress, at least during the period of the
enactment of the several titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, tended
to rely to a large extent on the courts to decide whether there should be
a private right of action, ratherthan determiningthis questionfor itself.""
It may be easy enough to summon a political consensus that there should
be a public policy in favor of this or that. The balances that must be struck
in determining appropriate sanctions and methods for their administration allegedly may present issues where there is much less agreement. 3
It may, therefore, be much easier to leave it to the courts to define, at
least in part, the contours of the enforcement scheme through the creation
of private remedies.
Rehnquist refuses to accept the responsibility thus delegated. The clearstatement approach to implied rights of action, therefore, informs Congress
4 4
that "the ball, so to speak, may well now be in its court.""
To the extent
such issues are directly confronted in the legislative, rather than the
judicial, arena the chances that all affected interests may be heard are
increased and any decisions reached will be subject to relatively
widespread public scrutiny.4 5
This theme received one of its most extensive treatments in Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence in Industrial Union Department v. American
456 U.S. at 408 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("[Clourts should recognize that intricate policy calculations are necessary to decide when new enforcement measures are desirable additions to
a particular regulatory structure. Judicial creation of private rights of action is as likely
to disrupt as to assist in the functioning of the regulatory schemes developed by Congress."); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 748 n.19 (Powell, J., dissenting). See
also Frankel, supra note 296, at 553. But see Pillai, supra note 137, at 27.
" The Rules of Decision Act preserves to Congress its policy-making prerogatives from
judicial usurpation. But if Congress purports to delegate those powers to the courts, the
Act by its terms provides no protection given the exception in cases "where ... statutes
of the United States otherwise require or provide ....
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). At the
same time, a concern for democratic decision-making underlies both the RDA, see infra
text accompanying notes 436-37 and the non-delegation doctrine. See infra text accompanying notes 401-05.
"' Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 742 (Powell, J., dissenting).
402 Id.
at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (emphasis added in part).
o Cf. id. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting)
404 Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
...
See id. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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4
PetroleumInstitute,
" involving delegation of law-making power to an administrative agency. Invoking the authority of the very few cases in which
the Supreme Court has invalidated such delegations,10 he found that even
the indulgent tests evolved over the years in approaching matters of this
nature could not sustain the power of the Secretary of Labor under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act4"' to establish regulations applicable
to toxic substances where no "safe" level of occupational exposure is
known.0 9 According to Rehnquist, the guidance given by Congress to the
Secretary was entirely inadequate in supplying him any concrete direction
on an issue which the Justice believed was fundamental: to what extent
may or must cost to the regulated parties be considered in setting the
permissible standard for worker exposure to harmful substances.410 It was
not that the legislature had simply overlooked this problem. The legislative
history established to his satisfaction that Congress was well aware what
was at stake.4"" It was obvious to Justice Rehnquist that the issue was
so politically divisive that the members could at most agree to disagree
and thereby intentionally or unintentionally "pass the buck" to the agency
for resolution." 2
Of course, requiring Congress to confront this problem and come to
a solution might mean that there would be no federal regulation of toxic
substance exposure in the workplace. Such a result appeared inevitable
to Justice Rehnquist, as he made clear during the next Term in his dissent
in American Textile ManufacturersInstitute,Inc. v. Donovan."3 The costs
thereby imposed by adherence to the constitutional separation of powers
as he conceived it to be might be significant; they must be borne
nonetheless."'
'c' 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Although unable to agree on an opinion, five members of the
Court agreed that the Secretary of Labor's occupational safety and health standard for
benzene should be set aside.).
" See, e.g., Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
408 29 U.S.C. 5 651-78 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
The provision at issue provided, in relevant part, that the Secretary of Labor
...in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful physical
agents ... shall set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such employee
has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period
of his working life.
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
448 U.S. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
" Id. at 676-82, 685.

02

Id at 685.

", 452 U.S. 490 (1981) (cotton dust standard held invalid in various particulars though
29 U.S.C. 5 6(b)(5) held not to require a cost-benefit analysis). See id. at 546.
"4For a vigorous dissent from this view, see K.C. DAvIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
5 3:1-2 (Supp. 1982). While Professor Davis appears to admit that in some cases overbroad
delegations might run afoul of constitutional limitations, id. at 16-17, according to him
legislators can constitutionally agree to disagree and thereby grant an agency the power
to make major policy decisions in at least some cases. Id. at 15.
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Assuming a stance of that nature would prove particularly difficult for
a judge receptive to the idea of governmental regulation of the economy,
but considerably easier for one, like Justice Rehnquist, who is partial to
classical laissez-faire theory."5 This is the case whether we are dealing
with a delegation to an agency or in the area of judicial creation of rights
of action where the existence or non-existence of these rights may
determine the strength or weakness, in practice, of whatever legislative
policy is embedded in the regulatory statute.
Moreover, it would appear that if courts are seen as impermissibly taking Congress off the hook by exercising common law powers in creating
private remedies for statutory violations, there are limits on the
legislature's ability to expressly or implicitly delegate substantive lawmaking power to the courts... in other areas where, in Justice Rehnquist's
view, "fundamental" policy decisions have not been made by the people's
elected representatives." 7 Rehnquist never purports to suggest criteria
for determining when a decision can be so characterized. Perhaps it is
a question of "I know it when I see it.""' 8 Absent a more definite judicial
standard for testing impermissible delegations of power, the dangers of
arbitrary decision-making and invocation of this doctrine to mask policy
disagreements with Congress are obviously substantial."9
In addition, since every statute intentionally or unintentionally contains
some delegation of power to the courts to make law"" under the name
of "statutory interpretation,""' one wonders if the Rehnquist approach
would lead to instances where the Court refuses to apply (or invalidates)
a statute which it believes ask too much of the judiciary in terms of making "fundamental" decisions." While he seems willing to accept broad
delegations in the case of jurisdictional grants," control of judicial
creativity in the substantive area presumably strikes at what he perceives
to be the heart of the problem of redressing the "dramatic shift of power
from the legislative to the judicial branch" and reducing the large "role
"' Fiss supra note 8, at 21. See also Note, Intent, supra note 16, at 910-12 (1982) (suggesting that the clear statement approach of the current Supreme Court masks a "vision
of laissez-faire individualism." Id. at 911.).
41.The Sherman Act is such a delegation. See supra text accompanying note 121. See
also Note, Intent, supra note 16, at 898 n.54.
417 In fact, in the Industrial Union case, Justice Rehnquist specifically noted that Congress had "improperly delegated that choice to the Secretary of Labor and, derivatively,
to this Court," 448 U.S. at 672. (emphasis added).
"' See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (Stewart, J., concurring) (referring to "hardcore" pornography). See also Bruff, JudicialReview and the President'sStatutory Powers,
68 VA. L. REv. 1, 27, 29 n.123 (1982).
49 Justice Rehnquist himself never explains why he views questions regarding what the
available remedies for statutory violations should be as meeting the test for "fundamental" policy decisions.
" See supra text accompanying note 23.
411See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 745 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. at 547 (noting that "I do
not mean to suggest that Congress... must resolve all ambiguities.") (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
" See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
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that the federal judiciary now plays in the day-to-day operations of
government."4 "
In short, an approach demanding that "fundamental" decisions be made
by Congress may result in more than just refusal to recognize a private
right of action to sue for violations of a federal statute because, as a matter
of statutory construction, there is no "express" or "implied" congressional
intent to create the action. The Court's examination of the statute in its
proper context may also lead to the even more drastic result of invalidating the statutory scheme in the name of democratic decision-making.
Many of the same concerns which arguably underlie Justice Rehnquist's
treatment of pendent jurisdiction problems in the section 1983 context425
are found in the area of implied rights of action, including docket congestion and the desire to vindicate majoritarian decision-making. The
importance of the latter factor differs in the two contexts. By remitting
section 1983 actions to state courts, collective societal decisions may more
likely survive. Refusing to exercise a law-making power in the remedial
area is a two-edged sword, attempting both to preserve policy decisions
made by the elected representatives and, at the same time, to ensure
that key policy decisions are determined by the branch of government
most responsive to the popular will," even at the price of political
deadlock.
Rehnquist's clear-statement requirement in the implied rights area,
supported as it purportedly is by desires to avoid disruption of, for
example, congressionally established priorities for the use of judicial
resources 427 and to reinforce the institutional responsibility of the
legislature"s is, at least on the surface, consistent with the traditional
view of the appropriate function of such an approach. 4 At the same time,
to the extent it is motivated in part by his hostility to the substance of
congressional programs fueled by his own laissez-faire philosophy, it is
ultimately inconsistent with the legislative supremacy and
majoritarianism 0 to which he pays such obeisance.
V.

CONGRESSIONAL DISPLACEMENT OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Thus the question was whether the legislative scheme "spoke directly
to a question" ... not whether Congress had affirmatively proscribed
the use of federal common law.
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigane'

Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60 A.B.A. J. 787 (1974).
supra text accompanying notes 268-90.
448 U.S. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
'2 See supra text accompanying 376-89.
' See supra text accompanying notes 390-423. See also Industrial Union Dep't v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 687 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
"' See supra text accompanying notes 46-61.
'o See Fiss supra note 8, at 16, 20.
'= See

41

451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981).
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A. The Role of Federal Common Law
In resolving an issue, the further a federal court must stray from federal
statutory and constitutional sources the more restricted its ability becomes
to rely on judge-made rules which disregard state law. As Justice Brandeis
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,32 "[t]here is no federal general
observed in Erie
3
common law.

4

1

This restriction on federal judicial law-making has several sources, one
which was expressly adverted to in the Erie case, that is, the limited
substantive competence of the national government as compared with the
states, which under the Constitution retain all powers not delegated to
the United States.41 4 More relevant for present purposes, however, is an
additional limitation related to the constitutional allocation of power among
the three branches of the national government. Congress is the only branch
established by the Constitution which is expressly vested with law-making
powers, thereby making it the unchallengeable policy-maker within its
constitutionally prescribed limitations.4 35 Thus, Congress is presumptively, absent special circumstances, the forum in which such policy should
be initially made, subject to popular control exercised through the electoral process.4 8
The intended consequence of the constitutional scheme is, however,
more than the assurance of popular sovereignty. The composition of the
national legislature is such that the interests of the states as political
entities are represented. 437 This is particularly important in view of the
principle of federal supremacy which may dictate the supersession of state
law-making competence."3 When, therefore, existing or potential state law
is displaced by congressional action which conflicts with that law or where
Congress acts with a view toward occupying the "field,' '439 the states at

least have been represented in the decision-making process leading to
that result.4 ' To the extent that rule-making by the federal judiciary
qualifies as part of "the Laws of the United States" within the meaning
of the Supremacy Clause, 4 ' a matter about which there appears to be
no doubt,"2 federal judge-made law, created by an unelected, life-tenured
...304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1 Id. at 78.

Id. at 79-80. See U.S. CONST.amend. X. See also Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87
693, 700-04 (1974).
" See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
"' See Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw", supra note 370, at 800 n.12 (1957).
' See Wechsler, supra note 47.
2.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
...
See Note, The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 41.
"I See, e.g., Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw", supra note 370, at 800 n.12.
2.
.41 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
" See, e.g., Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78
MICH. L. REV. 311, 370 n.176 (1980). See also Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668,
677 (Rehnquist and O'Connor join in Powell dissent objecting to expansion of admiralty
jurisdiction and the resulting displacement of state law).
'

HARV.L. REV.
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corps of officials, is presumptively inconsistent with these two constitu-

tional premises.
The Rules of Decision Act' is the statutory expression of the underlying
principles of limited national substantive competence and limited judicial
power to create law even within the sphere of policy-making committed
to the national government.444 As indicated previously,445 Justice Rehnquist bases his strict approach to implication of private remedies from
statutory and constitutional provisions, in part, squarely on the separation of powers aspect of the Erie case. 446
There is, however, room for judicial law-making in substantive matters on the federal level. The application of statutes provides opportunity in this regard since, as noted before,447 this may involve not just
"discovery" of meaning, but also an "assignment" of meaning."' Moreover,
in admiralty and other unique areas of federal concern,44 9 as well as pursuant to express or implied delegations of power from Congress,450 the
federal courts have exercised an important substantive policy-making competence. Limitations on congressional time and lack of foresight by its
members may create gaps in statutory schemes; so too may the lack of
consensus in the legislature regarding the appropriate handling of a problem. All these factors have been suggested as justifying the existence
of federal common law,4"' though creation of a judge-made rule on a "fundamental" issue as to which there was no political consensus in Congress
presumably presents for Justice Rehnquist the "worst case" for judicial
law-making 5 Concern regarding undercutting delicately wrought congressional balances is clearly another factor counselling restraint in judicial
intervention."
4- 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976): "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply:'
",4 See Mishkin, Some FurtherLast Words On Erie, supra note 395. By its terms, however,
the RDA is not a restriction on congressional delegation of law-making power to the courts,
see supra note 400, but rather on the courts' usurping law-making competence without
congressional consent.
", See supra text accompanying notes 290-99.
", See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. at 37-39, 43; Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
at 717-18.
"' See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
"' See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S.
77, 95, 97 (1981).
Id. at 95-96.
' See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (S 301 of the
Taft-Hartley Act seen as delegation of power to make law in labor area). See generally
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 642 (1981). See supra note 443.
"I1See Mishkin, The Variousnessof "FederalLaw", supra note 370, at 800. See also Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrack and Ash: Some Implicationsfor Implication,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975) (noting as rationale for judicial implication of remedies under
federal statutes the ability of the courts to assess the need for private enforcement to
carry out the legislative goals, which ability may not be shared by Congress).
See supra text accompanying notes 401-24.
See supra text accompanying notes 398-99.
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However, regardless of the difficulty of the task, it would seem that
ultimate legislative supremacy demands that, while respecting the
presumption in favor of democratic decision-making on issues of major
importance, the courts put forth the effort to carefully ascertain whether,
on balance, their creation of interstitial rules is necessary to give effect
to legislative policies which have a political consensus. 4 4 Reasonable persons may differ in their analysis of the desirability of federal common
law in particular instances. Additionally, one must confront the reality
that judicial perceptions are likely to be heavily influenced by differing
political philosophies and, less defensibly, by hostility to the substantive
programs enacted by Congress.
B. The Creation and Displacement of Federal Common Law of Interstate
Pollution Control
An issue which has not often been confronted by the Supreme Court
is the effect on existing federal common law of subsequent enactment
or amendment of a regulatory scheme. An express statement by Congress that the judge-made rule is thereby displaced obviously controls
and presents an easy case. On the other hand, what if the legislature
fails to make its intent, if any, crystal clear on the issue of displacement?
The Court confronted this very problem in the recent case of City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois4" (Milwaukee I), where Justice Rehnquist again wrote
the majority opinion. As in the area of implied rights of action, the argument favoring judicial power to supplement regulatory schemes was the
loser. Moreover, the approach adopted seemed to create a presumption
in favor of displacement of federal common law remedies when Congress
had "entered the field."
Nine years earlier, in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (Milwaukee D)," the
Supreme Court held that the lower "federal courts [would] be empowered
to appraise the equities of the suits alleging creation of a public nuisance " "
affecting interstate or navigable waters, at least when the action was
brought by a state against the political subdivision of another state.
Several months after that decision was handed down, Congress enacted
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) Amendments of 1972"
which drastically altered the previous federal approach to controlling pollu" Cf.City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 339 n.8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See
supra text accompanying note 370. See also D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins.
Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Were we bereft of the common
law, our federal system would be impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of
attempting all-complete statutory codes..
' 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
406 U.S. 91 (1972).
' Id. at 107.
' Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, codified in pertinent part at 33 U.S.C. S 1251-65,
1281-92, 1311-28, 1341-45, 1361-76 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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tion of the nation's waters." 9 Henceforth, both municipal"' and private4 '
dischargers of pollutants" into the navigable waters of the United States"
would have to obtain permits from either the United States Environmental
Protection Agency 4 6' or from state agencies delegated permit-issuing
authority by the EPA." Issued permits would include effluent limitations"
which, at times in conjunction with water quality standards,4" 7 became
the principal weapon in the fight against water pollution.
The State of Wisconsin was delegated permit authority by the federal
government and issued permits to several of its municipal corporations
which were responsible for the discharge of sewage into Lake Mighigan.'"
Violations of those permits prompted an enforcement action by the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources which, in turn, resulted in
a state court order that the sewage authorities comply with the terms
of their permits as well as take additional steps to control sewage
overflows.469 However, in response to a suit brought by the State of Illinois
which claimed that its waters were being polluted by the out-of-state
discharges, a federal district court in Illinois invoked its federal common
law powers under Milwaukee I to enter an order imposing even more
stringent effluent controls on the Wisconsin defendants,'" though the
restrictions imposed by the administrative and judicial action of the State
of Wisconsin met the minimum requirements established by federal
statutory law." 1
In concluding that no federal common-law remedy was available to
Illinois in these circumstances,'72 Justice Rehnquist began his analysis in
Milwaukee I in the entirely predictable manner of noting the narrow scope
of federal common law in view of the separation of powers considerations
underlying the Erie case:
,' See, e.g, Comment, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 14
B.C. INDUS. & Com. L. REV. 672 (1973). What follows in the text is merely a barebones outline
of the post-1972 water pollution regulatory scheme which has been well described elsewhere.
See, e.g, W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4.1-4.21 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RODGERS].
See, e.g, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
See, e.g, id. (b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A).
,.2See id. S 1362(6) (1976).
' See id. § 1362(7) (1976).
1342(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
See id.
1342(b).
See id.
" See id. § 1362(11) (1976).
"G Water quality standards are basically "legal expressions of permissible amounts of
pollutants allowed in a defined water segment." See RODGERS. supra note 459, S 4.8 at 415.
In contrast, an effluent limitation is a restriction on quantities, rates and concentrations
of chemical, physical, biological or other constitutents discharged from a particular point
source.
" 451 U.S. at 311.
4C9 Id.
4,1

Id. at 311-12.

4,1 Id. at 319-20.
4, 451 U.S. at 332 (Rehnquist, J.).
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Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common law courts
and do not possess a general power to develop and apply their own
rules of decision. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins .... The enactment of a
federal rule in an area of national concern, and the decision whether
to displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal
judiciary, purposely insulated from democratic pressures, but by the
people through their elected representatives in Congress.47
While grudgingly admitting that the Court had found it necessary in a
"few and restricted" instances474 to develop federal common law, Rehnquist
noted that it was essential to acknowledge the "paramount authority of
Congress" to displace such judge-made rules.475
When does that displacement occur? "[W]hen Congress addresses a
question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law
the need for such an unusual exercise of lawmaking by federal courts
disappears.14 6 Or when the legislative scheme has "spoke[n] directly to
'
displacement of the previously existing federal common law
a question,"477
occurs. The "scope of the legislation" must be reviewed478 but the crucial
inquiry is clearly "not whether Congress ha[s] affirmatively proscribed
4'7
the use of federal common law."
In Aldinger, the somewhat similar phraseology, "whether ... Congress
has addressed itself to the party,"'4 8 was apparently not intended as the
"test" for the existence of pendent party jurisdiction but merely as an
introduction to the type of inquiry deemed crucial.48 ' In Milwaukee II,
however, the various formulations quoted above appear designed to function as some sort of test 4" for ascertaining the continued viability of federal
common law. As such, the question becomes what do they mean?
In one of the cases relied on by Justice Rehnquist, Arizona v.
4
California,
" the Court refused to apply the federal common law doctrine
of equitable apportionment, which it had developed in dealing with
interstate water disputes, where it found that Congress had, by statute,
provided its own method of apportionment. 84 In Mobil Oil Corp. v.

...
Id. at 312-13 (citations omitted in part).
...
Id. at 313 (quoting Wheedlin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)). See also Milwaukee
II, 451 U.S. at 314 (federal common law exists where "the Court is compelled to consider
federal questions 'which cannot be answered from federal statutes alone.' ") (emphasis added).
41 Id at 313-14 (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 348 (1931)).
176 Id. at 314. See also id. at 315 n.8.
. Id. at 315 (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)). See
also id. at n.8.
...
Id. at 315 n.8.
4, Id. at 315.
" 427 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added in part).
48 See supra text accompanying note 207.
" 451 U.S. at 315 ("Thus the question was whether the legislative scheme spoke directly
to a question. . .. 1 (emphasis added). See also id. at n.8.
' 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
's
Id. at 565-66.
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Higginbotham,4 5 another case cited in Milwaukee II, it was necessary to
determine whether to permit recovery of damages for "loss of society"
under the general maritime law when Congress had not authorized such
damages in the Death on the High Seas Act,48 though in that statute
it had expressly provided for pecuniary losses. The Court refused to allow
such relief, rejecting the argument that Congress did not have the last
word on this issue." While in neither case had Congress "affirmatively
proscribed" the judicially created remedy which was sought, the Court
in both cases seemed to feel that providing a different or additional remedy
would disregard the implicit congressional intent that the expressly provided legislative solution be the only one.
Ascertaining the existence of such an implied intent often presents the
judiciary with such subtle and difficult problems that the invocation of,
for example, the "expressio unius" maxim4 is often the easiest way out.
In short, the line between "rewriting" of congressionally established
ground rules, thereby undercutting legislative supremacy, and permissible
"supplementation" is a very thin one indeed. The Rehnquist analysis in
Milwaukee II certainly established that Congress had said something about
the problem vexing the State of Illinois. But what implications arose from
what it did say?
Justice Rehnquist devoted approximately three pages of his analysis
to generalized references regarding the "comprehensive" nature of the
1972 amendments, along with numerous citations to the legislative history
which similarly repeated that conclusory language.48 Moving to specifics,
he correctly noted that the defendants had been issued permits in compliance with applicable federal statutory requirements and administrative
guidelines 9 Congressional intent to require, as a matter of federal law,
compliance with those provisions, and no more, might very well be
assumed in the case of a private or municipal source located in Wisconsin
and discharging pollutants which allegedly injured a downstream
Wisconsin citizen. For example, the FWPCA preserves the right of the
states to enact and enforce more stringent controls than required under
federal law,"" but a state need not take advantage of this option. Thus,
one can make a strong argument that Congress did not intend the federal
courts to usurp the choice of a state in regulating sources located within
492
its borders by fashioning federal common law.
436 U.S. 618 (1978).
46 U.S.C. SS 461-68 (1976).

487 436
411 See
'

U.S. at 624-26.

supra text accompanying note 214.

451 U.S. at 317-19 & n.12.

Id. at 319-24.
431

See 33 U.S.C. S 1370 (1976).

See also infra text accompanying note 529. See generally, Note, FederalCommon Law
and Water Pollution: Preemption or Preservation?,49 FORDHAM L. REV. 500, 516-19 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution].
4

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:211

Milwaukee I, however, did not involve the typical case of intrastate
pollution, but rather involved interstate pollution which impinged on
Illinois' ability to do better than the federally required minimum in maintaining water quality493 and to protect its quasi-sovereign interests in
preserving its resources and mitigating health risks to its residents. 4 '
Justice Rehnquist pointed to various provisions in the FWPCA which
purport to give some solace to a state in Illinois' position." 5 In spite of
these provisions, there is considerable doubt whether the receptor state
has any effective recourse under the FWPCA to protect its interests in
those cases where the permit-issuing state fails to take the objections
posed by a neighboring state into account in fashioning the terms of the
final permit and the EPA thereafter fails to veto the issuance of the permit thus drafted.'96 Oddly enough, however, there are provisions in the
statute which might, in some instances, be invoked by a state desiring
to protect its public health or welfare or its policy in favor of higher water
quality standards from pollution originating elsewhere.4 Yet, due to over'" Note, Federal Common Law and Water Pollution, supra note 492, at 530. See also 451
U.S. at 352-53 & n.32.
Cf. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907).
9 451 U.S. at 325-26. See 33 U.S.C. S 1342(b)(3) (state whose waters are affected by issuance of permit must receive notice of permit application and be allowed to participate
in public hearing on the permit); id. § 1342(b)(5) (affected state must have opportunity to
submit written recommendations concerning the permit applications to the issuing state
and EPA; both the affected state and EPA must receive notice and statement of reasons,
if any, if recommendtions of affected state not accepted); id. § 1342(d)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980) (EPA may veto any permit issued by a state when the waters of another state
may be affected); id. § 1342(d)(4) (EPA may issue a permit if issuing state is not responsive
to its objections).
" See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 859-62 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (decision by EPA not to veto a permit is not judicially reviewable). See also Note, FederalCommon Law and Water Pollution,supra note 492 at 530; ef Note, City ofMilwaukee v. Illinois:
The Demise of FederalCommon Law Nuisance Actions in Interstate Water PollutionDisputes,
35 S.W. L.J. 1097, 1108 (1982).
Of course, even if a state could obtain judicial review of a failure by the EPA to veto
a permit, the deference that would be shown the administrative agency's decision might
be seen as assuring less than optimal protection for the interests of the receptor state.
It should also be noted that the EPA can waive, as to any permit application, its veto
power. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(3).
' Not expressly discussed by Justice Rehnquist was the possibility of a suit by Illinois
against Milwaukee pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976) (citizen suit). "Citizen" includes "persons" with an interest affected by unlawful pollution, id. § 1365(g); "person" includes states,
id. § 1362(2), (5); and the enforceable "effluent standards or limitation," id. § 1365(a), includes limitations under § 1311, id. § 1365(f), which in turn encompasses more stringent
standards adopted by a state pursuant to authority preserved in 5 1370, id. S 1311(b)(1)(c).
CompareCommonwealth of Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119
(1st Cir. 1976) (state can invoke § 1365), with United States v. City of Hopewell, 508 F.
Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980) (state cannot invoke S 1365), both cases dealing, however, with
suits by states where the pollution originated. This is not to say there are not
counterarguments to the availability of a citizen suit in the circumstance of Milwaukee
II (e.g., the oddity of considering a state as a "citizen" as well as whether S 1370 refers
to standards made applicable to out-of-state dischargers).
More significantly, § 1365 expressly contemplates suits by a governor of a state against
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sight or for some other undisclosed reason, the Court in Milwaukee II
never mentioned these provisions, though reference to them might have
strengthened the argument in favor of displacement.
Finally, the Court was unwilling to read a provision which expressly
saves common law remedies498 to preserve the federal common law
recognized by Milwaukee I in view of what the Court considered persuasive
evidence previously marshalled by it establishing that in enacting the
FWPCA Congress had "addressed" and "spoken directly to the issue"
and thereby displaced federal common law.' Similarly unhelpful to Illinois
was a pre-enactment colloquy among Senators Muskie, Griffin, and Hart
which, according to Justice Rehnquist, in no way suggested any intent
concerning the continued validity of federal common law."'
Putting aside the strength of the case that might have been summoned
in favor of displacement,5 1 the overall analysis offered by Rehnquist falls
far short of convincingly demonstrating an express or implied intent of
Congress to confine the remedies for interstate pollution to those explicitly
referred to in his opinion. In fact, the available evidence was arguably
consistent with the existence of a congressional intent to preserve
Milwaukee I, as Justice Blackmun argued in dissent,"2 or at least the lack
of intent either way on the issue.5O The existence of some mechanisms
to adjust the conflicting interests of neighboring states is suggestive of
an intent to displace, but unless the "expressio unius" 4 maxim is given
controlling weight, their creation in 1972 by Congress is hardly
dispositive.15 Moreover, even aside from the decision in Milwaukee 1,the

the EPA where the latter agency is failing to enforce an "effluent standard or limitation,
the violation of which is occurring in another State and is causing an adverse effect on
the public health or welfare in his State, or is causing a violation of any water quality
requirement in his State." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(h) (1976). One case has in fact suggested that
this provision pre-empted the federal common law of nuisance. See Commonwealth of
Massachusetts v. United States Veterans Admin., 541 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 1976). Interestingly the Court in Milwaukee H at one point directs its attention to part of § 1365, 451 U.S.
at 327-29 (discussing 5 1365(e)). Moreover at one point the opinion of the court of appeals
mentions § 1365(h). See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 160 n.17 (1979). Where the source
of discharge is in compliance with the requirements of the state where it is located (the
situation in Milwaukee I/), this provision might not be available. Had the Court expressly
considered this provision, it would, therefore, have had to determine if a negative implication arose from this section.
49833 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (1976).
41 451 U.S. at 328-29.
Id. at 329-32.
"' See supra text accompanying note 497.
See 451 U.S. at 337-47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" Justice Blackmun's dissent suggests that only if Congress had formed an intent to
foreclose the use of federal common law would Milwaukee I be superseded. See, e.g., 451
U.S. at 338. Thus, the lack of intent either way on the issue would permit continued exercise of the Court's law-making powers. Compare this with the discussion of Curran,supra
text accompanying notes 364-68.
See supra text accompanying note 214.
" See 451 U.S. at 345 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, had on numerous
prior occasions displayed a willingness to fashion federal common law when
interstate disputes arose." 6 Congress arguably was aware of this tradition in enacting the 1972 FWPCA Amendments which expressly preserved
at least some common law remedies. 0 7 Furthermore, the fact that the
federal agency responsible for administration of this "comprehensive"
regulatory scheme believed that federal common law survived the
enactment of the 1972 amendments 8 should have counted for more than
it apparently did in the Court's analysis. 9 It certainly suggested that
the existence of federal common law would not necessarily undercut
administration of the statute. At one point Justice Rehnquist himself
seems to suggest that Congress gave no thought to the impact of the
510
Act on federh1 common law.
Examination of the statutory framework with a view toward discovering
an intent, express or implied, to preclude reliance on judge-made rules
for dealing with the problem of interstate pollution would have been
consistent with the Court's approach in the Arizona and Higginbotham
cases."' But Rehnquist's approach is expressly not phrased in terms of
a search for such congressional intent.-" Rather, the question he posed
was merely whether the legislature had "addressed" and "spoken" to the
type of problem before the Court. Apparently, if Congress has made any
provision for treatment of the problem, a presumption arises against court
supplementation of the legislative provisions.
The ease with which displacement occurs, even in the face of evidence
consistent with a congressional intent to preserve the pre-existing common law, indicates that implicitly operating in the Rehnquist approach
may be another clear-statement requirement. He may be saying this: at
least where Congress has entered a "field" with the enactment of what
the Court considers a "comprehensive" regulatory scheme dealing in some
part with the issue under scrutiny, pre-existing federal common law
remedies in the area covered by the new statute will be considered as
extinguished unless Congress, in clear and unambiguous words, has
evidenced its intent that such remedies be preserved. That those judicially
created remedies appear to usefully supplement the statutory scheme will
not save them. Since even the savings clause in the FWPCA 55 was not
See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), and other cases cited
in 451 U.S. at 335-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
451 U.S. at 337-38 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58 See 451 U.S. at 347 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The Court's opinion never mentions the EPA's interpretation.
510 451 U.S. at 329 n.22.
511 This was in part Justice Blackmun's approach. See id. at 338. See also supra note 503.
511 See also 451 U.S. at 315 ("the question [is] ...
not whether Congress ha[s] affirmatively proscribed the use of federal common law."); id. at 329.n.22 (explicitly suggesting
that Congress gave no thought to the impact of the Act on federal common law). But see
id. at 332 n.24 (referring to congressional intent in 1972).
51 33 U.S.C. S 1365(e) (1976).
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sufficient evidence of the requisite intent to preserve, the requirement
for clarity is a stringent one indeed. Absent a clear declaration of intent
to preserve, the Court will, in Justice Rehnquist's words, be deemed to
have "occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive
regulatory program." 4 Furthermore, it seems that this general approach
would likewise obtain with regard to not only the displacement of preexisting common law rules, but also, creation of at least some judge-made
law following enactment of a "comprehensive" regulatory scheme." 5 That
is, Congress must clearly permit such judicial supplementation if it is to
occur.

C. Comparison with Preemption Analysis
Rehnquist's use of language familiar in cases involving preemption of
state law by federal statutes516 was clearly not unintentional. Early in
the opinion he expressly compared the Court's approach in preemption
cases with that deemed appropriate in regard to the displacement of
federal common law.5 17 Various commentators have suggested the close
affinity which preemption analysis bears to the question of whether an
issue should be governed by federal judge-made law. 518 In both, the basic
inquiry is whether the relevant federal interests demand the subordination
of state substantive policy." 9 In recent years the Court has given
increasing weight to state interests in preemption analysis.-' As illustrated
451 U.S. at 317.
See 451 U.S. at 319 n.14 ("[Flederal courts create federal common law only as a necessary
expedient when problems requiring federal answers are not addressed by federal statutory
law.").
Barely a week before Milwaukee II was decided, the Court per Justice Stevens, in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77 (1981), refused
to create a federal common law right of contribution on behalf of an employer whose violations of the Equal Pay Act and title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were allegedly
caused by a union. The Court relied in part on the "comprehensive" nature of the regulatory
scheme. Id. at 97. In so holding the apparently more liberal approach of Justice Stevens,
see supra text accompanying notes 349, 364-71, came to the fore: "Thus, once Congress
addresses a subject, even a subject previously governed by federal common law, the justification for law-making by the federal courts is greatly diminished." Id. at 95 n.34 (emphasis
added) (not eliminated!).
, See Note, The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 41, at 624.
115

451 U.S. at 316-17.
See, e.g., BATOR & MISHKIN, supra note 123, at 800-06; Monaghan, The Supreme Court
1974 Term: Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1975)
5,

SB

[hereinafter cited as Monaghan].
I CompareWallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) ("In deciding whether
rules of federal common law should be fashioned, normally the guiding principle is that
a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law in
the premises must first be specifically shown."), with D. CURRIE. FEDERAL COURTS 887 (2d
ed. 1975) (under preemption doctrine, the "question ... is the familiar choice-of-law problem of accommodating conflicting governmental interests: Does the purpose of the federal
law require subordination of state policy?"). See also Note, The PreemptionDoctrine,supra
note 41, at 654.
5- See Note, The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 41, at 623.
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by the Dublino case, 52' a federal statute will not be found to oust state
law except when absolutely necessary, or, otherwise stated, absent a "clear
expression" of Congress to that effect. In the past, federal common law,
whose establishment similarly displaces state law-making competence, has
frequently been created with somewhat less regard given to state
interests." However, on occasion, as in Wallis v. PanAmerican Petroleum
Corp.,-' the Court has suggested that only a "significant".conflict between
state and federal policy can justify a federal court's exercise of law-making
powers."' In Milwaukee II, Justice Rehnquist explicitly relied on Wallis.'
The clear-statement requirement may be part of an attempt to bring the
approach to creation of federal common law into closer harmony with
recent preemption analysis in terms of the weight attached to state
interests in the balance." 8 The Court's reticence to oust state law in each
instance can be traced in large part to an increased unwillingness to
disturb the traditional preference for local, not national, solutions to problems of governance,5 27 absent clear guidance from the only branch of the
federal government where the interests of the states are represented."
Once Congress has "entered the field" with a "comprehensive"
regulatory scheme, the Court's solicitude for state interests is at least
as strong. The Court's solicitude is likely magnified, based on the assumptions: that the express intrusion on state prerogatives thus sanctioned
represents all that Congress, as representative of the states, could
reasonably have considered appropriate; that further incursions created
by federal common law possess a peculiar likelihood of unwittingly undoing
political compromises thus reached; and that, having once marked out
a field for national action, Congress should assume the responsibility of
facing and unambiguously sanctioning further politically sensitive displacement of state law-making competence. 29 From this view would follow the
importance of a requirement for a "clear statement" to permit the operation of federal common law. 3 ' A protective approach to state interests,
therefore, might explain in part why, for example, the "comprehensive"
nature of the federal statutory framework at issue in Dublino was not
521 See

supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
See Monaghan, supra note 518, at 12-13 n.69.
384 U.S. 63 (1966).
'
Wallis, 384 U.S. at 68. See also Monaghan, supra note 518, at 13 n.69.
451 U.S. at 313.
For a commentator urging such a result, see Monaghan, supra note 518, at 13 n.69.
See, e.g., Hart, The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489,
497 (1954); Note, The Preemption Doctrine, supra note 41, at 639; Note, Federal Common
Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1969).
52 See Wechsler, supra note 47 and text accompanying notes 59-61.
" Cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 317 n.9. It is not entirely clear when
Justice Rehnquist would classify a scheme as "comprehensive" in ways relevant to the
analysis suggested in the text. Obviously the manipulation of that classification based on
a judge's substantive preferences would not be overly surprising. Compare, ag., supra text
accompanying notes 68 & 419.
' See supra text accompanying notes 50-61.
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seen as sufficient to oust the New York Work Rules, 1 while in Milwaukee
II, that same characteristic of the regulatory scheme at issue purportedly
played a part in the displacement of the pre-existing federal common law.'
But even if similar concerns generally animate a parallel approach to
issues of preemption and the appropriate scope of federal common law,
they do not necessarily dictate an equally restrictive attitude in all
contexts. First, the creation of federal common law need not displace state
regulation, for the judge-made rules may be fashioned to incorporate state
standards." More importantly, in a case such as Milwaukee II, where the
real clash was between states with differing perceptions regarding the
needs for pollution control," the issue was no longer the simple one of
state versus federal interest. This, in itself, created a significant argument
based on the structure of the federal union in favor of federal resolution
according to an independent body of federal law, 5 though it did not by
itself necessarily lead to the conclusion that that body of federal law should
be court-created.
D. Rationales for Clear-Statement Requirement in Milwaukee II
Other than the general considerations discussed above, 8 were there
peculiar factors at work in Milwaukee H which led to the result in that
case?
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has functioned as an umpire of
the federal system in disputes between the states, 7 as well as served
to protect the quasi-sovereign interests of one state against interference
by citizens of other states.08 It has done so based on the constitutional
grant in article III of original jurisdiction- 9 and its statutory counterpart. 0°
In the process it has formulated federal common law. 1 Moreover, as the
Court in Milwaukee I indicated, where federal common law provides the
basis of an action, section 1331 assures an alternative federal forum in
the federal district courts for resolution of claims by one state against
the citizens of another.- 2 All this assures a neutral tribunal which can
"' See 413 U.S. at 414-15.

See 451 U.S. at 317-19 & 319 n.14.
"

See, e.g, United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
See supra text accompanying notes 493-94.
See Monaghan, supra note 518, at 14.
See supra text accompanying notes 526-32.
See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (apportioning waters of interstate

stream).
See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S 230 (1907) (air pollution).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.

u See 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
51 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 335-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing
cases).
542 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Where there is a dispute between political subdivisions of a state
the diversity grant may be available. Id. at 97-98. In disputes between states per se, however,
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is original and exclusive. See 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976).
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flexibly adapt its remedies to the types of cases brought before it, without
being bound to apply the law of one of the contestants.
At the same time, Congress is constituted in such a way that the states'
interests are directly represented. m Determination of the extent to which
the social and economic costs of attaining or maintaining environmental
quality standards higher than the federally required minimum should be
imposed on jurisdictions other than the receptor states requires delicate,
politically sensitive policy choices which might more appropriately be made
by the electorally responsible branch of the national government which
is directly reflective of state interests. At least Congress can establish
the general framework of criteria for making decisions in this area even
if it delegates their implementation to an administrative agency. That
agency can assure that not only the required technical competence, but
also continuous oversight and uniform treatment, to the extent desirable,
is brought to the solution of a problem that may not be an isolated one.5"
Adequately tackling interstate pollution on a case-by-case basis may in
fact be a task which appears beyond "judicial expertness" and thus one
which Congress should permit the courts to engage in, if at all, only after
a sober second thought."5
On one occasion prior to Milwaukee I, similar considerations caused the
Supreme Court to refuse to exercise its original jurisdiction to hear an
interstate pollution dispute. 48 There are indications in Rehnquist's
Milwaukee II opinion that a similar view may have in part motivated the
clear-statement approach as applied there. At the outset of his analysis
he emphasized the electoral responsibility of Congress as contrasted with
the courts. Later in the opinion he noted the "vague and indeterminate"
nature of nuisance concepts,5" as well as the technical difficulty of the
subject matter area and the unsuitability of "sporadic" and "ad hoc"
approaches to the problem of water pollution." 9 The opinion may have
reflected not merely a concern over displacement of state law by federal
judge-made law, but also, the feeling that in adjusting conflicting state
interests in this area, the federal courts had nothing to offer to make
a bad situation better.

5, See Wechsler, supra note 47.
5" Cf., e.g., Luneburg, The NationalQuest for Clear Air 1970-1978: Intergovernmental Problems and Some ProposedSolutions, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 397, 432-37 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Luneburg].
5 Cf. Wellington & Albert, supra note 52, at 1561.
5" See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 501-04 (1971) (emphasizing the
particular difficulties facing a court which generally functions as an appellate tribunal).
See also Comment, FederalCommon Law and Interstate Pollution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1439
(1972).
5" 451 U.S. at 313.
548 Id. at 317.
5" Id.
at 325 (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 95 (1971).
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It is, of course, possible that the 1972 amendments to the FWPCA
represented a compromise whereby some states accepted the federally
imposed minimum on the condition that the remedies for interstate pollution which might be used to require higher levels of pollution control be
limited.5" A desire to avoid upsetting such a political compromise could
have played a role in Milwaukee II. Even if this was not the case, the
political difficulties involved in adjusting the divergent interests of the
various states with regard to transboundary pollution are a likely explanation for the failure of Congress to confront this problem in a comprehensive fashion.55' Therefore, even if Congress had, in 1972, clearly made
known its desire that the federal courts continue to fashion a federal common law of interstate pollution control, Justice Rehnquist's approach in
the delegation and implied rights area--" suggests that perhaps he would
not be willing to take the legislature off the hook.5
Besides concern over the suitability of the federal courts as policy
makers in this complex area, an additional rationale may underlie Justice
Rehnquist's presumption in favor of displacement of judge-made law in
Milwaukee I1. Unlike much federal common law,'" the federal common
law of interstate pollution itself gave rise to subject matter jurisdiction
in the federal courts under the general federal question grant.55 The
extinguishment of that body of substantive law could have been designed,
in part, to reduce the docket congestion in the federal courts and any
resulting distortion of congressionally established docket priorities."'
Regardless of the number of suits like Milwaukee II likely to arise, the
demands on a court's time created by the formidable nature of the factfinding process involved in cases of that nature 7 had been remarked upon
5
ten years earlier by Justice Harlan in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp. 5
Absent section 1331 as a basis for jurisdiction, the only alternative federal
forum for a suit by a state against the political subdivision of another
state (or another citizen thereof) would in most instances be the Supreme
Cf. Leybold, Federal Common Law: Judicially Established Effluent Standards as a
Remedy in FederalNuisance Actions, 7 ENVIRON. AFF. 293, 310-11 (1978).
-51 Cf. Luneburg, supra note 544.

See supra text accompanying notes 400-24.
In fact, it is not at all clear where Justice Rehnquist would draw the line between
those decisions regarding available remedies which can be expressly delegated by Congress to the courts and those which are so fundamental (as in the implied right area) that
only Congress can make them. See supra text accompanying notes 418-19.
See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (federal common law is "law" of
the United States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. S 1331).
- Cf Note, Federal Common Law Under FederalStatutes, Supreme Court, 1980 Term,
96 HARV. L. Rnv. 290, 299 (1981).
"1 In Milwaukee II, the trial alone lasted six months. See 451 U.S. at 333 (Blackmun,

J., dissenting).
1 401 U.S. at 503-05.
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Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. 9 But the Court has viewed
that jurisdiction as discretionary, at least where there is an alternative
forum, which apparently can include the state courts.560
The ultimate result of Milwaukee II may be, therefore, to force states
in Illinois' position into their own courts or the courts of the states where
the polluting sources are located, in which case, any available remedy
will depend on state law.-61 Justice Rehnquist does not suggest that state
nuisance law in the interstate context has been preempted by the FWPCA
and, in fact, at one point he seems to imply that in the absence of federal
common law, state law can function in this area.6 2 This would also seem
to follow from the presumption against preemption of state law which
he so much emphasizes. 6
But even if state nuisance law is theoretically available in the case of
interstate pollution,5" the remedy may be of little practical use. A suit
by Illinois in the courts of Wisconsin to limit the discharges from a
Wisconsin source largely for the benefit of Illinois citizens is not likely
to be well received. Moreover, even though Milwaukee II suggests that,
consistent with federal constitutional limitations, Illinois courts could
exercise territorial jurisdiction over the Wisconsin defendants,565 it is not
clear that the courts of Illinois would be willing to enter an equitable
decree against an out-of-state defendant. 66
' See 28 U.S.C. S 1251(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). This is the case except where 5 1365 of
the FWPCA provides the basis for a suit. See supra note 497. Justice Rehnquist failed
to expressly consider in the opinion the possibility of a S 1365 suit, see supratext accompanying note 497, suggesting perhaps his lack of awareness of that option.
' See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 500 (1971). But see City of
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 98 (1972) (impliedly suggesting that the alternative forum
must be another federal court).
6 See 451 U.S. at 353-54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
s 451 U.S. at 313 n.7 ("If state law can be applied, there is no need for federal common
law; if federal common law exists it is because state law cannot be used."). See also, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. S 1251(b) ("It is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect
the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution."); id. S 1370 (preservation of state authority). But see 451 U.S. at 328 (referring, in
passing, to more stringent state nuisance law under S 1370 as being applicable to in-state
discharges.).
11 At no point does the FWPCA expressly preempt the use of state law in this context.
Justice Blackmun in his dissent seems to interpret the majority opinion as not suggesting
preemption. 451 U.S. at 353-54.
' Of course, if Rehnquist would in addition find preemption of state law, the states
must await congressional action on the issue.
451 U.S. at 312 n.5. Accord Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. at 500-01.
See, e.g., R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW S 46 (3d ed. 1977). The availability of
damage remedies would be a different matter, though in many cases the receptor state
might not consider that fully effective in preventing future harmful discharges or providing
full compensation.
An interesting question is whether the refusal or likelihood of refusal by state courts
to enter requested relief would cause the Supreme Court to assume original jurisdiction,
see Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. at 500-01, and if it did, whether it would
apply state or federal law. The case just cited seemed to assume either that state law
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To the extent that state adjudication proves of little practical assistance
in these cases, Congress will be the only forum in which effective action
can be taken. Absent a response from that body, Milwaukee II may mean,
therefore, that the problem of interstate pollution goes without an effective solution, a distressing result to those concerned with environmental
protection. However, for those, like Justice Rehnquist, apparently imbued
with a philosophy of laissez-faire,567 the result may not be altogether
displeasing. 68 Whether this was the intended upshot of the decision is
difficult to tell.
CONCLUSION
If Justice O'Connor's remarks at her Senate confirmation hearings
regarding the proper role of the judiciary were intended to reassure her
interrogators and their constituents that she will not knowingly disregard
ascertainable legislative intent and in that manner "make law," the
response must be that the constitutional separation of powers demands
no less, unless perhaps in some instances she wishes to recall the Congress to its constitutional policy-making duties by means of clear-statement
requirements. Hopefully Justice Rehnquist would concur. If her remarks
were intended to suggest that she sees no room for judicial creativity.
in statutory interpretation, Justice Rehnquist may be forced to dissent.
If Justice O'Connor sees a small role for the federal courts in
supplementing congressional enactments with federal common law, Justice
Rehnquist will no doubt welcome her concurrences in his opinions dealing
with such matters and happily concur in hers. Hopefully, however, their
views in that regard will not be motivated by their hostility to particular
congressional programs. If they are, both Justices will be making law
in a matter which is fundamentally at odds with the separation of powers
principles to which they pay such obeisance.

would apply, id. at 498 n.3, 504, or that the state and federal common law of nuisance
were the same. Id. at 500. Yet by Justice Rehnquist's analysis the federal common law
of interstate pollution has been displaced and this is arguably the case regardless of the
jurisdictional base relied upon. Query also what law would apply if Illinois sued Wisconsin
in the Supreme Court where subject matter jurisdiction in such a case is exclusive. See
28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
It should also be noted that Justice Rehnquist has read § 1251(a) to apply only in the
most compelling cases. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 760-61 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This opinion also suggests that he would determine the existence of an alternative
forum by a strict standard. Id. at 769-70.
See supra text accompanying note 415.
Compare this result to his approach in Alding.r. See supratext accompanying notes
279-90.

